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Willful Patent Infringement and 
Enhanced Damages After In Re Seagate:  
An Empirical Study 
Christopher B. Seaman 
ABSTRACT: Willful patent infringement is a critical issue in patent 
litigation, as it can result in an award of up to treble (enhanced) damages. 
In a 2007 decision, In re Seagate, the Federal Circuit significantly altered 
the standard governing willful infringement by requiring the patentee to 
prove at least “objective recklessness” by the accused infringer. Many 
observers predicted that this heightened standard would result in far fewer 
willfulness findings and enhanced-damages awards. To date, however, 
there has been no comprehensive empirical study of Seagate’s actual impact 
in patent litigation. 
This Article fills that gap by analyzing six years of district-court decisions—
three years before and after Seagate—on willful patent infringement and 
enhanced damages. Surprisingly, it determines that willful infringement 
was found in only about 10% fewer cases after Seagate. In addition, after 
Seagate, juries find willful infringement substantially more often than 
judges at trial. However, enhanced damages are awarded less frequently 
and in lower amounts when juries find willfulness compared to judges. 
Finally, this Article evaluates the impact of several common factors on 
willful infringement decisions after Seagate. Based on the empirical data 
collected in this study, the existence of a “substantial” or “legitimate” defense 
to infringement is the strongest predictor of a finding of no willfulness after 
Seagate, while evidence of copying by the accused infringer was the strongest 
predictor of willfulness. In contrast, the remaining factors studied—
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opinions of counsel, attempts to design around the patent, reexamination at 
the PTO, and bifurcation of willfulness from liability at trial—had no 
statistically significant effect on willfulness decisions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Willful infringement is a critical issue in patent litigation. A finding of 
willfulness can result in an award of enhanced damages up to triple the 
amount of actual damages proven by the patentee,1 as well as the possibility 
of paying the patentee’s attorney’s fees.2 Indeed, penalties in the range of 
tens of millions of dollars for willful infringement are not uncommon.3 
Until recently, if a potential infringer had actual knowledge of a patent, 
it was obligated to satisfy “an affirmative duty to exercise due care to 
determine whether or not [it] is infringing.”4 Among other things, this duty 
usually compelled an accused infringer to obtain a competent opinion of 
counsel before engaging in potentially infringing acts.5 Failure to do so was 
likely to result in a willfulness finding.6 
However, in 2007, the Federal Circuit significantly altered the standard 
governing willfulness with its en banc decision in In re Seagate Technology, LLC 
(“Seagate”).7 Specifically, Seagate abandoned the “affirmative duty of due 
care” requirement, instead requiring the patentee to demonstrate by clear 
and convincing evidence that the accused infringer was objectively reckless 
in its infringement.8 It also held that potential infringers were no longer 
obligated to obtain an opinion of counsel.9 As a result, knowledgeable 
observers asserted that Seagate would make proving willful infringement 
much more difficult, ultimately resulting in far fewer willfulness findings and 
enhanced-damages awards.10 To date, however, there has been no 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (stating that “the court may increase the damages up to three 
times the amount found or assessed”). 
 2. Id. § 285. 
 3. See, e.g., Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 670 F. Supp. 2d 815, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(awarding approximately $21 million in enhanced damages for willful infringement), appeal 
docketed, No. 11-1103 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 7, 2010); i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 
2d 568, 596 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (awarding $40 million in enhanced damages for willful 
infringement), aff’d as modified, 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion withdrawn and superseded 
by 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Final Judgment 
at 2–3, DataTreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-72 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2011) 
(awarding $26.6 million in enhanced damages for willful infringement). 
 4. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 
1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 5. Id. at 1390. 
 6. See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 
227, 239 (2004) (“If no attorney opinion is presented in defense of a willfulness charge, the 
result is usually a finding of willfulness . . . .”). 
 7. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 
U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 8. Id. at 1371. 
 9. Id.; see also Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 
45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1197 (2008) (“[Seagate] made clear that there is no affirmative duty on 
the part of an exploiting firm to search for a patent, nor any duty to search for advice from 
counsel on the validity of a patent that is uncovered if a search is done.”). 
 10. See infra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. 
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comprehensive empirical study of Seagate’s actual impact on patent 
litigation. 
This Article seeks to fill that gap with an empirical study of willful patent 
infringement and enhanced-damages decisions in the district courts for an 
approximately six-year period—three years before and three years after the 
Seagate decision. The data gathered from this study reveal several surprising 
results. In particular, predictions that Seagate would have a dramatic impact 
on willfulness findings in the district courts apparently were incorrect, as 
willfulness was found only about 10% less often after Seagate,11 and this 
relatively small change was not statistically significant.12 
Furthermore, judges and juries appear to reach different decisions 
under Seagate’s “objective recklessness” standard. At trial, juries found willful 
infringement at similar rates both before and after Seagate.13 In contrast, 
judges found willfulness only a small fraction of the time after Seagate, as 
compared to a majority of the time before Seagate.14 However, when judges 
do find willfulness, they almost always award enhanced damages,15 and the 
amount of enhancement is usually larger than when a jury finds willfulness.16 
This Article also evaluates the impact of several common factors on 
willfulness findings after Seagate. From the collected data, a “substantial” or 
“legitimate” defense to infringement is the most significant predictor of a 
finding of no willfulness.17 In contrast, evidence of copying by the accused 
infringer is highly correlated with willfulness.18 Surprisingly, however, 
neither opinions of counsel nor evidence that the accused infringer had 
attempted to “design around” the patent were statistically significant in 
willfulness decisions.19 In addition, whether a patent-in-suit has been 
reexamined by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) appears to 
have little impact on willfulness.20 Finally, bifurcation of willfulness at trial 
also does not have a statistically significant impact on willfulness.21 
Part II explains in greater detail the role willful infringement and 
enhanced damages play in patent litigation. It also recounts the Federal 
Circuit’s evolving standards governing willfulness, from Underwater Devices 
through Seagate. Part III describes the research questions addressed in this 
 
 11. See infra Part IV.A.2 and Table 1. 
 12. See infra Part IV.A.2 and Table 1. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 14. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 15. See infra Part IV.C.2 and Table 7. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C.3 and Table 9. 
 17. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 18. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 19. See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.4. 
 20. See infra Part IV.B.5. 
 21. See infra Part IV.B.6. 
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Article and the methodology used to answer them. Finally, Part IV reports 
on the study’s results and offers some preliminary conclusions. 
II. WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
A. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A WILLFULNESS FINDING 
Patent infringement “is a strict liability offense,”22 and thus an accused 
infringer can be held liable for unintentional or accidental infringement.23 
Despite this, an accused infringer’s intent often plays an important role in 
patent litigation. Section 284 of the Patent Act permits the trial court, at its 
discretion, to award a successful patentee up to three times the amount of 
compensatory damages assessed by the finder of fact.24 Although willfulness 
is not explicitly mentioned in § 284, the Federal Circuit has interpreted this 
statute to require a “finding of willful infringement [a]s a prerequisite to the 
award of enhanced damages.”25 
As a result, the possibility of a willfulness finding can significantly affect 
a patent dispute. The Federal Circuit has explained that willfulness serves as 
“an economic deterrent to the tort of infringement.”26 In litigation, 
patentees commonly assert a claim of willful infringement.27 This threat can 
cause potential infringers to take various actions to prevent a willfulness 
finding, including obtaining an opinion of counsel that it does not infringe 
 
 22. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1576 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
 23. See, e.g., Blair v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (“It 
is, of course, elementary that [a patent] infringement may be entirely inadvertent and 
unintentional and without knowledge of the patent.”). See generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. 
Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 803–04 
(2002). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 25. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other 
grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); see also Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“Willfulness of the infringement is the sole basis for the court’s exercise of its 
discretion to enhance damages under [§] 284.”); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & 
Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Under our cases, enhanced 
damages may be awarded only as a penalty for an infringer’s increased culpability, namely 
willful infringement . . . .”). This view, however, is not unanimous among members of the 
Federal Circuit. In a concurring opinion in Seagate, Judges Gajarsa and Newman argued that the 
“court should not continue to read a willfulness requirement into section 284[] to support the 
enhancement of damages,” although they believed willfulness was still a “relevant 
consideration” to awarding such damages. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1384 
(2007) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J., concurring), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 26. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 27. See Moore, supra note 6, at 232 (finding that willfulness was asserted by the patentee in 
92% of cases). One important exception is Hatch–Waxman litigation, where the Federal Circuit 
has held that the “mere filing of an ANDA [abbreviated new drug application] cannot 
constitute grounds for a willful infringement” because such a filing is merely an “artificial act of 
infringement for purposes of establishing jurisdiction in the federal courts.” Glaxo Grp., Ltd. v. 
Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1349–51 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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or that the asserted claims are invalid,28 attempting to design around the 
patent’s claims,29 or settling litigation for amounts exceeding what the 
patentee could have obtained in ex ante negotiations.30 The prospect of 
enhanced damages is particularly powerful in light of recent compensatory 
damages awards exceeding $100 million, raising the possibility of an 
enhancement in the range of hundreds of millions of dollars.31 
Further, a court can award attorney’s fees for willful infringement. 
Under § 285, willful infringement qualifies as an “exceptional case[]” 
justifying the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing patent holder.32 
According to a 2009 survey by the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (“AIPLA”), in patent suits where $1 million to $25 million was at 
stake, the average costs of litigation—the majority of which is attorney’s 
fees—were over $2.7 million.33 For cases with over $25 million at issue, 
average litigation costs were even higher—over $6 million.34 In some cases, 
the attorney’s fees awarded under § 285 can be equal to, or greater than, the 
amount of compensatory damages.35 
 
 28. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that, prior to Seagate, an important factor for willfulness findings was “whether the 
adjudged infringer relied on legal advice” regarding noninfringement, invalidity, or 
unenforceability of the patent-in-suit). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending 
Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2003) (explaining the importance 
of opinions of counsel in deciding willfulness pre-Seagate and the problems caused by disclosure 
of such opinions). 
 29. SRI Int’l, 127 F.3d at 1465 (explaining that “attempts to design around and avoid the 
patent . . . should be taken into account” in determining willfulness). 
 30. See Scott Baker, Can the Courts Rescue Us from the Patent Crisis?, 88 TEX. L. REV. 593, 598 
(2010) (reviewing DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009)) (arguing that some patentees “sue[] and use[] the threat of a punitive 
remedy,” such as “treble damages for willful infringement, to extract a settlement that exceeds 
what it would have gotten if it licensed its patent ex ante”). 
 31. For example, in i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., a jury in the Eastern District of 
Texas awarded $200 million to the patentee and found that Microsoft had willfully infringed. 
598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). The district 
court awarded an additional $40 million in additional enhanced damages—a 20% increase—
instead of the maximum $400 million ($600 million total) that it could have imposed. Id. Both 
the willfulness finding and the enhanced-damages award were upheld by the Federal Circuit. Id. 
at 858–60; see also Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for 
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1663–65 (listing other large damage 
awards). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006); Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1555, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also JOHN W. SCHLICHER, 2 PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES § 9:55 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining that “[w]illful infringement is a sufficient basis for 
finding a case exceptional” under § 285). 
 33. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-155 
(2011). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Network Solutions, Inc., No. 2:04-cv-01971-
MCE-EFB, 2009 WL 981843 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009) (awarding approximately $488,000 in 
attorney’s fees after a jury awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages to the patentee); see also 
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B. EVOLVING STANDARDS FOR WILLFULNESS 
The doctrine of willful patent infringement has undergone numerous 
changes over the past three decades. This section describes the evolution of 
the standard for proving willfulness from the “affirmative duty of due care” 
to Seagate’s “objective recklessness” standard. 
1. Underwater Devices: The Affirmative Duty of Due Care 
In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act,36 which 
created the Federal Circuit and gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over 
nearly all patent litigation. The purpose of this new appellate court was to 
bring uniformity and consistency to patent law and help “manage” its 
development.37 
In Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., decided in 1983, the 
Federal Circuit swiftly asserted its newfound authority and established a 
national standard for willful patent infringement.38 In that case, an 
individual inventor named Robley obtained two patents for laying 
underwater pipes.39 The patents were assigned to Underwater Devices, which 
had a practice of informing prospective bidders for construction contracts 
on underwater pipelines that it owned the Robley patents and would license 
them to all bidders on equal terms.40 
Morrison-Knudsen (“M-K”), one of the world’s largest engineering and 
construction firms at the time,41 bid on an underwater-sewer project in Sand 
Island, Hawaii. Underwater Devices offered to license M-K the Robley 
patents for $200,000.42 Instead of taking a license, M-K obtained a short 
 
Order Re Precor’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees & Costs & Related Pleadings, Precor Inc. v. Life 
Fitness, No. C94-1586C (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2000) (awarding slightly over $5 million in 
attorney’s fees), vacated and remanded, 13 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Amended Judgment on 
Complaint and Counterclaim, Precor Inc. v. Life Fitness, No. C94-1586C (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 
1999) (awarding $5.25 million in compensatory damages), vacated and remanded, 13 F. App’x 
913 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 36. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 50 (1982). 
 37. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 14–16 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14–15; 
H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 16–24 (1981); see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 
1115–16 (2004) (explaining that “the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the 
patent law” was intended to make the court “act as the manager and developer of the patent 
law” and develop “a clearer, more coherent, and more predictable patent doctrine”). 
 38. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 
1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 39. Id. at 1382. The patents covered both the method and apparatus for laying such pipes. 
Id. 
 40. Id. at 1384. 
 41. See Morrison Knudson Corporation, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse. 
com/company-histories/Morrison-Knudsen-Corporation-Company-History.html (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2011). 
 42. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1384. 
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written opinion—only eight sentences long—from its in-house counsel 
asserting that the Robley patents were invalid in light of a prior publication 
and recommending M-K “refuse to even discuss the payment of a royalty” 
unless Underwater Devices sued.43 
In November 1974, Underwater Devices withdrew its offer and filed a 
complaint for patent infringement.44 At trial, the district court found M-K 
had willfully infringed the patents and tripled the $200,000 reasonable 
royalty award based on M-K’s failure to license the patents and awarded 
tripled damages.45 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed.46 It explained that: 
[w]here . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s 
patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to 
determine whether or not he is infringing. Such an affirmative duty 
includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal 
advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing 
activity.47 
The Federal Circuit held that while an opinion of counsel was “not 
dispositive of the willfulness inquiry,” it was “crucial to the analysis.”48 It 
concluded that the advice rendered by M-K’s in-house lawyer fell far short of 
satisfying this “affirmative duty of due care.” It found that the opinion 
contained only “bald, conclusory and unsupported remarks regarding 
validity and infringement of the Robley patents” and thus was “not legal 
advice upon which [M-K] was justified in relying.”49 
In subsequent decisions, an alleged infringer was required to obtain or 
disclose an opinion of counsel regarding infringement to satisfy this 
“affirmative duty of due care.” Failure to do so would result in a negative 
inference. Specifically, under the “adverse inference” rule, an infringer’s 
failure to obtain and disclose an opinion “would warrant the conclusion that 
 
 43. Id. at 1385. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1386. 
 46. Id. at 1389. The Federal Circuit has further explained that “[s]ince the issue of 
willfulness not only raises issues of reasonableness and prudence, but is often accompanied by 
questions of intent, belief, and credibility, appellate review requires appropriate deference to 
the special role of the trial court in making such determinations.” SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced 
Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 47. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389–90 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1230 (2008); see also Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc. 34 F.3d 1048, 
1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Possession of a favorable opinion of counsel is not essential to avoid a 
willfulness determination; it is only one factor to be considered, albeit an important one.”); 
JOHN SKENYON ET AL., PATENT DAMAGES LAW & PRACTICE § 4:19 (2009) (explaining that before 
Seagate, “failure to obtain and follow an opinion of counsel often result[ed] in a finding of 
willful infringement”). 
 49. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. 
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[the purported infringer] either obtained no advice from counsel[,] or did 
so and was advised that its [activities] would be an infringement of valid U.S. 
patents.”50 While this presumption was theoretically rebuttable at trial, in 
practice it was often highly persuasive.51 Not surprisingly, then, the adverse-
inference rule “increased the pressure on an alleged infringer to produce 
[an] opinion of counsel” at trial.52 
Furthermore, after Underwater Devices, subsequent Federal Circuit 
decisions suggested that willfulness required something less than intentional 
or deliberate infringement.53 For instance, in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., it 
explained: “‘Willfulness’ in infringement, as in life, is not an all-or-nothing 
trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that infringement may range from 
unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a 
patentee’s legal rights.”54 
Similarly, in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit held that “[t]he standard for proving willfulness” was whether an 
accused infringer had “prudently conduct[ed] himself with any confidence 
that a court might hold the patent invalid or not infringed.”55 “Actual 
knowledge” of the patent-in-suit was not required56—a statement at odds 
with the traditional understanding of “willful” in tort law, which requires 
disregarding a known risk of a highly likely result.57 
 
 50. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled 
by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); see also Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 
1988), overruled by Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337. 
 51. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 28, at 1091–92 (explaining that the adverse-inference 
rule was “likely to have a strong impact on a jury”); Shamita D. Etienne-Cummings, The Utility of 
Opinion of Counsel, in PATENT LITIGATION 2009, at 125, 128 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course 
Handbook Ser. No. G-983, 2009) (“Such adverse inferences were often the ‘deathblow’ to 
defendants attempting to avoid increased damage awards.”). 
 52. Justin P. Huddleson, Note, Objectively Reckless: A Semi-Empirical Evaluation of In re 
Seagate, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 102, 110 (2009). 
 53. See William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell, III, Understanding and Addressing the Unfair 
Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 424 (2004) (in 
a pre-Seagate article, explaining that it was “unclear whether a finding of willful infringement 
requires a determination that the defendant had intentionally infringed or whether a showing 
of recklessness or even negligence would suffice” (footnote omitted)). 
 54. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 55. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hall v. Aqua Queen Mfg., Inc., 93 F.3d 1548, 1555 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (applying the same standard set forth in State Industries, Inc.). 
 56. State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1581. But see State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 
1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“To willfully infringe a patent, the patent must exist and [the 
infringer] must have knowledge of it.” (emphasis removed)). 
 57. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (1971) 
(explaining that willfulness exists in tort law when an “actor has intentionally done an act of an 
unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken 
to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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After Underwater Devices and its progeny, willful infringement was found 
in most cases that reached a decision on the issue. In an important study, 
then-Professor (now Federal Circuit Judge) Kimberly Moore determined 
that from 1983 to 2000, willfulness was found 68% of the time in jury trials 
and 53% of the time in bench trials.58 Furthermore, she found that 
enhanced damages were imposed 95% of the time when a judge found 
willfulness, compared to only 63% of the time when a jury found 
willfulness.59 
2. Knorr-Bremse and EchoStar: The Interregnum 
If an accused infringer offered an opinion of counsel to rebut a 
willfulness claim, it was required to waive attorney–client privilege for “all 
other communications relating to the same subject matter.”60 The Federal 
Circuit required waiver for fairness reasons; specifically, “so that a party is 
prevented from disclosing communications that support its position while 
simultaneously concealing communications that do not.”61 
Before Seagate, the scope of waiver was hotly contested in litigation and 
varied greatly district by district. For example, some courts limited waiver to 
documents actually communicated to the client,62 while others required 
disclosure of all information related to the opinion’s subject matter, even if 
the client had not received it.63 There were also conflicts about the waiver’s 
timing; some cases limited waiver to communications and documents 
created before litigation,64 but others extended waiver to include documents 
 
 58. Moore, supra note 6, at 237. 
 59. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 399 n.134 (2000). 
 60. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also 
Danny Prati, Note, In re Seagate Technology LLC: A Clean Slate for Willfulness, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 47, 55 (2008) (“In patent litigation, assertion of the advice of counsel defense 
automatically waives [the attorney–client] privilege.”). 
 61. Fort James Corp., 412 F.3d at 1349. As one district court explained: “Fundamental 
fairness compels the conclusion that a litigant may not use reliance on advice of counsel to 
support a claim or defense as a sword in litigation, and also deprive the opposing party the 
opportunity to test the legitimacy of that claim by asserting the attorney-client privilege or work-
product doctrine as a shield.” Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E’Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 
1092 (D. Nev. 2003). 
 62. See, e.g., Ropak Corp. v. Plastican, Inc., No. 04 C 5422, 2006 WL 1005406, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 17, 2006) (explaining that the court “will take a narrow approach to the scope of the 
waiver” and ordered disclosure of only “the ‘opinion of counsel’ documents that were 
communicated or given to” the accused infringer). 
 63. See, e.g., McKesson Info. v. Trizetto Grp., Inc., No. 04-1258-SLR, 2005 WL 2290191, at 
*1 (D. Del. Sept. 20, 2005) (“The scope of the waiver is not limited to what was communicated 
to or from counsel, but extends to all information possessed by the alleged infringer that relates 
to the subject matters of the opinion letters.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Techs., Inc., No. 01 C 4182, 2002 WL 1917256, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2002); Dunhall Pharm., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1206 
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created through trial.65 Finally, there was a split in authority regarding which 
attorney’s communications were covered by waiver. Some courts waived 
attorney–client privilege for an accused infringer’s trial counsel, even if a 
separate firm had provided the opinion;66 others barred production of 
attorney work-product material created by trial counsel;67 and yet others 
adopted a “middle ground” by extending waiver “only to those trial counsel 
work product materials . . . communicated to the client.”68 
As a result, the waiver requirement created a “Hobson’s choice” for 
many accused infringers: (1) mount an advice of counsel defense against 
willfulness but be compelled to disclose (at least some) privileged 
communications containing sensitive information; or (2) maintain privilege 
and receive a harmful adverse-inference instruction.69 As a result, despite 
“strong structural incentives to rely on the advice of counsel at trial,” 
accused infringers often were fearful to do so because of the uncertainty 
about disclosing potentially harmful information that might undercut their 
case at trial.70 
In September 2004, the Federal Circuit attempted to address this 
dilemma in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp. 
(“Knorr-Bremse”) by overruling the adverse-inference rule.71 In an en banc 
decision, the court recognized this rule resulted in “inappropriate burdens 
on the attorney–client relationship” and undermined “open and confident 
relationships between client and attorney” by requiring disclosure to prevent 
an adverse inference.72 Because of these costs, the court held it was 
inappropriate “to draw a similar adverse inference from failure to consult 
 
(C.D. Cal. 1998); Kelsey-Hayes Co. v. Motor Wheel Corp., 155 F.R.D. 170, 172 (W.D. Mich. 
1991). 
 65. See, e.g., Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2003) 
(“[O]nce a party asserts the defense of advice of counsel, this opens to inspection the advice 
received during the entire course of the alleged infringement. Consequently, the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege or work product protection covers all points of time, including up 
through trial.”); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2001) 
(“[A]ll communications, both pre and post-complaint filing, should be disclosed.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 422–24; Chiron, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1188. 
 67. See, e.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E’Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095 (D. Nev. 
2003) (“The court will not compel defendant’s current litigation counsel to produce work-
product materials . . . .”). 
 68. Intex Recreation Corp. v. Metalast, S.A., No. CIVA 01-1213-JDB, 2005 WL 5099032, at 
*5 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2005). 
 69. See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 00 C 1475, 2000 WL 1847604, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 14, 2000) (citing Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643–44 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)); see also Prati, supra note 60, at 57–58. 
 70. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 28, at 1099. 
 71. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc); see also supra text accompanying notes 50–52 (explaining 
the adverse-inference rule). 
 72. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1343–44. 
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counsel.”73 However, Knorr-Bremse did not fully resolve the waiver dilemma 
because obtaining and disclosing an opinion of counsel remained one way—
if not the best way—to establish that an alleged infringer had discharged its 
“affirmative duty of due care.”74 
The following year, the Federal Circuit established a broad scope of 
waiver for attorney–client privilege in In re EchoStar Communications Corp.75 It 
held that when an alleged infringer relied on advice of counsel as a defense 
to willfulness, “the waiver applies to all other communications relating to the 
same subject matter,” including communications with outside counsel not 
involved with the opinion.76 For work-product material, the accused 
infringer had to produce all documents discussing or referencing client 
communications, but not “opinion” work product that had not been 
communicated to the client.77 
Thus, EchoStar placed trial counsel for patent defendants in a difficult 
position, as the communication of legal analyses and trial strategy to the 
client could make them discoverable. 
3. In re Seagate: The Rise of Objective Recklessness 
In the face of continuing criticism from academics and patent 
litigators,78 as well as legislative efforts to limit willfulness,79 in January 2007, 
 
 73. Id. at 1345. 
 74. See id. at 1345–46 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 
1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). One district expressed this dilemma as follows: 
We do not believe . . . that Knorr-Bremse completely eliminated the prejudice to a 
party facing a Quantum dilemma. Although the failure to obtain an exculpatory 
opinion of counsel no longer provides an adverse inference or presumption that 
the opinion was unfavorable, there continues to be an affirmative duty of due care 
to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others. Therefore, an accused 
infringer still must choose between waiving its attorney-client privilege to disclose a 
favorable opinion letter from counsel, which would weigh in its advantage in 
assessing the “totality of the circumstances” in a willful infringement charge, and 
maintaining its attorney-client privilege, thus undercutting its defense. 
Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Christopher Ryan Lanks, Note, In Re Seagate: 
Effects and Future Development of Willful Patent Infringement, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 607, 616 (2009) 
(explaining that, after Knorr-Bremse, “an alleged infringer did not have to produce an opinion of 
counsel, but it was still the best type of evidence to defend against willful infringement”). 
 75. In re Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 
1096 (2006). 
 76. Id. at 1299 (quoting Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted). EchoStar relied on an opinion by in-house counsel; 
its outside counsel had provided additional advice, but EchoStar had elected not to rely on it. 
Id. at 1297. 
 77. Id. at 1302–04. 
 78. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 143 (2006) 
(explaining that the current “willfulness doctrine . . . creates a huge barrier to the effective 
operation of the patent system’s disclosure function”); William F. Lee et al., The Doctrine of 
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the Federal Circuit granted en banc review of a petition for writ of 
mandamus by Seagate Technology, LLC (“Seagate”).80 In the district court, 
Seagate had announced that it intended to rely on three letters by Seagate’s 
outside opinion (nontrial) counsel to defend itself against a claim of 
willfulness, and it produced opinion counsel’s work product relating to the 
opinions.81 However, the patentee moved to compel production of all 
attorney–client communications and work product related to the opinions, 
including those created by Seagate’s trial counsel.82 The district court held 
that Seagate’s reliance on these opinions waived attorney–client privilege 
and work-product protection regarding their subject matter—infringement, 
invalidity, and unenforceability—for all of Seagate’s attorneys, including 
outside trial counsel.83 
The Federal Circuit stayed the trial court’s discovery order and ordered 
an en banc hearing on three questions: 
1. Should a party’s assertion of the advice of counsel defense to 
willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
to communications with that party’s trial counsel? See In re EchoStar 
Commc’n Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
2. What is the effect of any such waiver on work-product immunity? 
3. Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard 
announced in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 
F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983), on the issue of waiver of attorney-client 
privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in Underwater 
Devices and the duty of care standard itself?84 
Addressing the final question first, the Federal Circuit unanimously 
overruled the “affirmative duty of due care” standard first announced in 
Underwater Devices. After reviewing the history of willful infringement, it 
acknowledged that the “duty of care announced in Underwater Devices sets a 
lower threshold for willful infringement that is more akin to negligence.”85 
 
Willful Patent Infringement After Knorr-Bremse: Practical Problems & Recommendations, 7 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 169, 169 (2006) (“In Knorr-Bremse . . . the Federal Circuit changed the law of willful 
patent infringement but did not eliminate the practical dilemmas facing parties seeking to 
defend against charges of willful patent infringement.”); Lee & Cogswell, supra note 53, at 430–
32; Lemley & Tangri, supra note 28, at 1099–108; Kevin J. Kelly, Comment, Placing the Burden 
Back Where It Belongs: A Proposal To Eliminate the Affirmative Duty from Willful Infringement Analyses, 
4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 520–32 (2005). 
 79. See S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 80. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 214 F. App’x 997 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 81. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1366–67. 
 84. Id. at 1367 (quoting In re Seagate, 214 F. App’x at 997). 
 85. Id. at 1371. 
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This burden of proof, it explained, failed to comport with “the general 
understanding of willfulness in the civil context” and was inconsistent with 
recent Supreme Court decisions.86 In other contexts, including copyright 
infringement, the Federal Circuit recognized that “willful” conduct generally 
required at least reckless behavior.87 Consequently, to prove willfulness, it 
held a patentee must make “at least a showing of objective recklessness” by 
the accused infringer.88 It articulated a two-part test for demonstrating 
willfulness: 
[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an 
objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement 
of a valid patent. The state of mind of the accused infringer is not 
relevant to this objective inquiry. If this threshold objective 
standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this 
objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so obvious that it 
should have been known to the accused infringer.89 
Seagate also changed willful patent infringement in three other ways. 
First, it placed the burden of proof for establishing willfulness squarely on 
the patentee, rather than on the accused infringer. Under the previous 
“affirmative duty of due care” standard, when the alleged infringer received 
notice of a patent, it generally had an obligation to obtain an opinion of 
counsel to satisfy this duty.90 As Judge Dyk explained in Knorr-Bremse, this 
duty “effectively shift[ed] the burden of proof on the issue of willfulness 
from the patentee to the infringer.”91 In contrast, after Seagate, “[t]he 
burden is on the patentee to prove willful infringement.”92 
Second, the Federal Circuit’s abandonment of the “affirmative duty of 
due care” eliminated the requirement that an accused infringer must 
produce an opinion of counsel at trial.93 However, this did not mean that 
 
 86. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988); Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)). 
 87. Id. at 1370–71. 
 88. Id. at 1371. 
 89. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 90. See, e.g., Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (stating that an accused infringer “usually” had to obtain an opinion of counsel to avoid 
willfulness); Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that the 
affirmative duty of due care “will normally entail the obtaining of competent legal advice before 
engaging in any potentially infringing activity or continuing such activity”) , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1063 (1988); Lemley & Tangri, supra note 28, at 1091–92 & n.13. 
 91. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 92. Kellogg v. Nike, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (D. Neb. 2008). 
 93. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (“Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we 
also reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.”). 
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opinions of counsel suddenly became irrelevant to willfulness. Rather, 
Seagate explained that an accused infringer’s pre-litigation opinion of 
counsel on infringement or validity “may preclude [it]s conduct from being 
considered reckless.”94 
Third, after Seagate, if an accused infringer relies on an opinion of 
counsel, the waiver of attorney–client privilege typically does not extend to 
trial counsel. The Federal Circuit explained that, “as a general proposition, 
. . . asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of 
opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for 
communications with trial counsel.”95 This overruled some district court 
decisions after EchoStar that had reached the opposite conclusion. Similarly, 
work product created by trial counsel generally would not be subject to 
disclosure “absent exceptional circumstances.”96 
III. ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
After Seagate, many observers predicted the new “objective recklessness” 
standard would have a major impact on willfulness.97 For example, some 
patent litigators contended that Seagate created an “extraordinarily high 
burden” for proving willful infringement,98 that would “almost certainly . . . 
make proof of willful infringement much more difficult for patentees,”99 and 
that “only the clearest case[s] of infringement and validity would seem to 
satisfy” the new standard.100 Other commentators argued that Seagate set 
“[t]he bar for showing willful infringement . . . stunningly high,”101 and as a 
result, willfulness would be “exceptionally difficult to prove”102 and “the 
 
 94. Id. at 1374. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1375. 
 97. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 511 (3d ed. 2009) (“The Seagate standard 
significantly raised the bar on willfulness, making it more difficult for a patentee to establish 
than under the Federal Circuit’s previous standard.”). 
 98. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, IN RE SEAGATE: A NEW STANDARD FOR WILLFUL 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT 12 (2007), available at http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/ 
pub629.pdf. 
 99. Monte Cooper & Don Daybell, In re Seagate Revises Patent Law on Willfulness, ORRICK, 
HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE, LLP (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.orrick.com/publications/item. 
asp?action=article&articleID=1246. 
 100. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 98, at 12. 
 101. Patent Hawk, Waiving Under Willfulness, PATENT PROSPECTOR (Aug. 22, 2007, 1:48 
PM), http://www.patenthawk.com/blog/2007/08/waiving_under_willfulness_1.html. 
 102. Gene Quinn, Why Open Source Stalls Innovation and Patents Advance It, IPWATCHDOG 
(July 5, 2010, 6:23 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/05/open-source-stalls-
innovation/id=11506. 
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awarding of enhanced damages in patent cases [would be] rare.”103 Finally, 
several scholarly articles contended that Seagate would probably result in 
fewer willfulness findings.104 
To date, however, there has been no comprehensive study of Seagate’s 
actual impact on willfulness and enhanced damages in patent litigation. In 
addition, there has been no quantitative effort to determine the impact that 
common factors, such as legitimate defense(s) to infringement, copying, 
and opinions of counsel, may have on willfulness after Seagate.105 
This Article addresses these issues. First, it evaluates Seagate’s impact on 
willful infringement findings in the district courts. This includes how often 
willfulness is found, when willfulness is decided (the procedural posture), 
and whether juries and judges tend to reach different decisions. Second, it 
evaluates the effect of several common factors on willfulness decisions. 
Finally, it attempts to determine Seagate’s effect, if any, on enhanced-
damages awards. 
Empirical research is an appropriate tool to help answer these 
questions. Empirical studies use observations of data and statistical analysis 
to evaluate causal inference—that is, “whether one factor or set of factors 
leads to (or causes) some outcome.”106 Over the past decade, intellectual 
property scholars—particularly in patent law—have extensively used 
empirical research methods to help understand how courts apply legal 
doctrine.107 
 
 103. Saint-Gobain’s Motion and Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment of 
No Willful Infringement and for Protective Order at 8, Gemtron Corp. v. Saint-Gobain Corp., 
No. 1:04-00387 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2008) (on file with author). 
 104. See, e.g., Carl G. Anderson et al., Willful Patent Infringement: The First Year of the Post-
Seagate Era, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 13 (2008) (“Seagate has raised the bar with 
respect to succeeding on a claim of willful infringement.”); B.D. Daniel, Heightened Standards of 
Proof in Patent Infringement Litigation: A Critique, 36 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 416 (2008) (arguing that 
“the proof required by Seagate will be difficult to meet”); Lanks, supra note 74, at 636–37 
(contending that Seagate “makes it substantially harder to prove willful patent infringement” 
and that “most alleged infringers will . . . successfully defend against the willful infringement 
claim”); Prati, supra note 60, at 64 (concluding that Seagate “should result in fewer findings of 
willfulness”). 
 105. See Matthew Cook Bernstein, Difficulties Prevailing on Willful Infringement Post-Seagate, 
MINTZ LEVIN PATENT LITIGATION GROUP (MLGP) NEWSLETTER (Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris 
Glovsky & Popeo PC), May 2010, available at http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2010/ 
Newsletters/0430-0510-NAT-IP/web.html; Kurt M. Rogers et al., Seagate: Trends Over the Last 
18 Months, LAW360.COM (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID= 
8289. 
 106. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2002); see 
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125 
(2002) (“Empirical methods are those that employ means for the systematic observation of 
experience in pursuit of inductive ends.”). 
 107. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair 
Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Christopher 
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In particular, scholars have used empirical legal research to compare 
decisions before and after a landmark case to evaluate its impact on 
litigation outcomes.108 It also can “allow[] scholars to verify or refute . . . 
claims about case law,”109 such as “the impact of a new precedent, statute, or 
legal doctrine,”110 and can augment traditional doctrinal analysis “by 
identifying previously unnoticed patterns that warrant deeper study.”111 
Finally, empirical methods can help “study the factors that determine the 
outcomes of cases.”112 
B. STUDY DESIGN 
An original dataset was created for this study. The author attempted to 
identify all patent cases that decided willfulness from Knorr-Bremse, in 
September 2004, through July 2010. This represents almost six years of 
decisions divided about equally before and after Seagate. 
No single source contained a complete and easily accessible list of 
decisions on willful infringement. Therefore, several different sources were 
used to create a comprehensive dataset. First, the author searched Westlaw 
databases of district-court decisions from September 2004 through Seagate in 
August 2007,113 and then from Seagate through July 2010.114 This was 
 
A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases 
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 237, 259 (2006); Moore, supra note 6, at 227; Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in 
Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) [hereinafter 
Moore, Forum Shopping]; Moore, supra note 59, at 365; Lee Petherbridge, On the Decline of the 
Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 (2010); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law 
Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2009); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal 
Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 
(2007); David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); Wagner & 
Petherbridge, supra note 37. 
 108. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010) (studying the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal on court rulings in Rule 12(b)(6) 
motions). 
 109. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 77 (2008) (explaining that empirical methods can help evaluate “the impact 
of a new precedent, statute, or legal doctrine”). 
 110. Id. at 91. 
 111. Id. at 87. 
 112. Id. at 94. 
 113. For this time period, the following Terms & Connectors search was run in the Westlaw 
District Courts Cases database (“DCT”): patent! /30 ((willful! /5 infring!) “enhanced 
damages”) & da(aft 9/12/2004 & bef 8/20/2007). 
 114. For this time period, two searches were run: (1) a Terms & Connectors search in the 
Westlaw Federal IP – District Courts Decisions database (“FIP-DCT”): ((willful! /s infring!) 
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followed by a search of Federal Circuit opinions, both published and 
unpublished, to identify any willfulness decisions potentially missed in 
district-court searches.115 
Not all willfulness decisions result in a written opinion, however.116 To 
help identify these cases, databases of intellectual-property verdicts and 
settlements were searched in both Westlaw117 and LexisNexis.118 A Westlaw 
database of intellectual-property news stories was also searched.119 The 
author also reviewed all patent jury verdicts identified by Patstats.org, a 
resource on patent-litigation statistics created and maintained by the 
University of Houston Law Center’s Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Information Law.120 
Finally, the Lex Machina database of intellectual-property litigation was 
searched to capture any willfulness decisions missed by the other sources. 
Lex Machina is a website originally created by the Intellectual Property 
Litigation Clearinghouse (“IPLC”) at Stanford University121 and contains 
information on all patent-infringement litigation since January 1, 2000.122 
 
(enhanced! /s damag!)) /p (patent “in re seagate” 284) & da(aft 8/20/2007 & bef 
7/30/2010); and (2) a Terms & Connectors search in the Westlaw District Courts Cases 
database (“DCT”) for pretrial motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12: (“12(b)(6)” 
or “12(c)” or “motion to strike” or “motion to dismiss”) and patent w/200 willful! and Seagate 
& da(aft 8/20/2007 & bef 7/30/2010). 
 115. The following Terms & Connectors search was run in the Westlaw Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals Cases (“CTAF”) database: (willful! w/7 infring!) or “enhanced damages” or 
“increased damages”. 
 116. For example, there may be no district-court opinion when a verdict of willfulness is 
entered after trial, but the parties settle the dispute before the district court rules on post-trial 
motions. See, e.g., Verdict Form, Pioneer Corp. v. Samsung SDI Co., No. 2:06-CV-384 (DF) (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 29, 2008) (jury verdict of willful infringement). Similarly, there may be no district-
court opinion when the finder of fact determines there was no willfulness, and the patentee 
does not pursue judicial review (post-trial or appeal) of this decision. See, e.g., Verdict Form, 
Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., No. 2:05-CV-463 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2007) (jury verdict 
of no willful infringement); see also Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (verdict of no willful infringement not appealed by patentee). 
 117. The following Terms & Connectors search was run in the Westlaw Intellectual 
Property Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlement Summaries (IP-JV) database: patent w/50 
((willful! w/15 infring!) or “enhanced damages”) & da(aft 01/01/2004). 
 118. The following Terms & Connectors search was run in the LexisNexis Jury Verdicts and 
Settlements, Combined (“ALLVER”) database: patent w/75 ((willful! w/5 infring!) or 
“enhanced damages” or ((treble! or triple!) w/3 damage!)). 
 119. The following Terms & Connectors search was run in the Westlaw Intellectual 
Property News (“IPNEWS”) database: patent w/50 willful! w/5 infring! w/75 (verdict or 
judgment or jury or judge) & da(aft 01/01/2004). 
 120. PATSTATS.ORG, http://www.patstats.org (last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 121. The Genesis of Lex Machina, LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com/about/genesis (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 122. Need To Know?: Get Access, LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com/database/features 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
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The author used the website’s instructions to search for grants or denials of 
willful infringement123 for all U.S. District Courts.124 
From these sources, the author compiled a list of cases that reached a 
final decision on the merits regarding willfulness. A “final decision on the 
merits” existed when there was a final decision on willfulness in the district 
court and the issue had been contested by the parties. Obviously then, 
decisions on willfulness after both jury and bench trials were included in the 
dataset. Similarly, a “final decision on the merits” existed when willfulness 
was finally decided in a pretrial motion, such as a motion for summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.125 The dataset also 
included decisions on motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6)126 if these decisions resolved willfulness for that case—
most commonly, if the motion was granted and the patentee did not reassert 
willfulness in an amended pleading.127 Finally, entry of judgment as a matter 
of law (“JMOL”), either during or after trial, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50 on willfulness also was a final decision on the merits.128 
In contrast, a finding of willfulness after entry of default judgment 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55129 was not considered “on the 
merits” because the parties did not contest the issue. Therefore, all default 
judgments were excluded from the dataset.130 
Because the dataset included only district-court decisions, it is 
important to note this study did not attempt to evaluate willfulness decisions 
 
 123. Lex Machina How-To Guide, LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com/database/howto 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 124. The following parameters were used for Lex Machina’s Advanced Search form 
(http://lexmachina.com/search/form): Search Terms - Any Words: “willful” or “willfulness”; 
Case Type: Patent; Case Event: Judgment or Verdict (required 2 separate searches, one for each 
Case Event); Event Date Range: 9/13/04–6/1/10. 
 125. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 126. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 127. In contrast, decisions on Rule 12 motions that did not reach a final decision on 
willfulness—such as the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a willfulness claim—were 
excluded from the dataset. 
 128. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. However, if a motion for a new trial was granted under Rule 59(a), 
the case would not qualify as a final decision on the merits (because the previous willfulness 
decision would have been vacated), unless there was a subsequent decision on willfulness after 
the new trial. 
 129. FED. R. CIV. P. 55. 
 130. Including these default judgments would have misleadingly skewed the study’s results 
towards higher willfulness findings. Upon entry of default, the complaint’s factual allegations 
relating to liability are deemed to be true. See, e.g., Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 871 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 255 (2010). As a result, entry of a default judgment—typically 
because the accused infringer failed to answer the complaint—almost always resulted in a 
finding of willfulness. See, e.g., P.S. Prods., Inc. v. Unique Cutlery, Inc., No. 4:09CV00664 SWW, 
2010 WL 1980848 (E.D. Ark. May 13, 2010); Crescent Servs., Inc. v. Mich. Vacuum Trucks, 
Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2010); Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Astechnologies, Inc., No. 
02-40114, 2008 WL 544615 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2008). 
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at the Federal Circuit level. In other words, if a jury found willful 
infringement at trial, but the Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, this would 
still be classified as a finding of willfulness.131 The author decided to focus 
on willfulness decisions at the district-court level because this is where most 
patent cases are finally resolved and because relatively few Federal Circuit 
decisions reach a different conclusion on willfulness compared to the 
district court.132 
From these sources, 309 cases were identified as reaching a final 
decision on the merits on willfulness between September 2004 and July 
2010.133 This represents approximately 1.9% of all patent cases filed during 
this time period.134 Although this figure initially may appear low, it is 
important to note that the overwhelming majority of patent cases settle 
 
 131. See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 555 U.S. 1070 (2008). 
 132. This is in part because willfulness is a question of fact and will not be overturned by 
the Federal Circuit unless the decision was clearly erroneous (if the district court was the finder 
of fact) or unsupported by substantial evidence (if the jury was the finder of fact). See, e.g., 
Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008); ACCO Brands, 
Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2007). But see Spine Solutions, Inc. 
v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing 
district court’s denial of accused infringer’s motion for JMOL of no willfulness). 
 133. Of these, 137 cases reached a final decision on willfulness before the Federal Circuit 
decided Seagate on August 20, 2007, and 172 reached a final decision on willfulness after 
Seagate, for a total of 309 cases. In three cases, there was an initial decision on willfulness, but 
this decision did not become “final” for a variety of reasons. See Telecomm. Sys., Inc. v. Mobile 
365, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-485, 2008 WL 7555484 (E.D. Va. Sept. 25, 2008) (jury found willful 
infringement on May 25, 2007, but plaintiff later filed waiver of its claim for willful 
infringement); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, 6, Orion IP, L.L.C. v. Mercedes-Benz 
USA, L.L.C. (Hyundai Motor America), No. 6:05-CV-322 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2008) (Dkt. 638) 
(jury found willful infringement before Seagate, but district court declined to enter judgment on 
that aspect of the verdict after Seagate, explaining that it “will indicate to the public that the 
Court has not effectuated [the jury’s willfulness] finding”); Lucent Techs., Inc v. Extreme 
Networks, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 459 (D. Del. 2005) (jury found no willful infringement; the district 
court later granted a new trial on multiple issues, including willfulness, due to the defendant’s 
violation of the court’s evidentiary rulings, but the case was dismissed with prejudice before 
retrial). 
 134. According to the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics compiled by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, 2829 patent cases were filed during the twelve months 
ending March 31, 2005; 2812 patent cases were filed during the twelve months ending March 
31, 2006; 2814 patent cases were filed during the twelve months ending March 31, 2007; 3017 
patent cases were filed during the twelve months ending March 31, 2008; 2796 patent cases 
were filed during the 12 months ending March 31, 2009; and 2892 patent cases were filed 
during the twelve months ending March 31, 2010. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, U.S. 
COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (providing access to statistics for years 2005–2010). Assuming patent 
cases from April 2010 through July 2010 were filed at a similar rate as the preceding six years 
(an average of 238 cases per month for 4 months, for an estimated 952 cases), and further 
assuming that one-half of the cases for the period from April 2004 through March 2005 were 
filed after the Knorr-Bremse decision (in September 2004), the estimated number of patent cases 
filed during the time period of this study is 16,698. 309/16,698 = 1.85%. 
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before reaching a decision on the merits.135 Previous studies have found that 
only 3–5% of patent infringement claims are decided at trial.136 And many 
cases that do reach a verdict never decide willfulness—because the patent is 
found not infringed,137 the patent is found invalid,138 or the patentee did not 
assert willfulness. Furthermore, this percentage is similar to Judge Moore’s 
study, which found willfulness was decided in 2.1% of all patent cases 
terminated in 1999–2000.139 
Each case was coded for several variables using a standardized set of 
coding instructions.140 These variables were: (1) the final decision on 
willfulness in the district court;141 (2) the procedural posture when 
willfulness was decided (e.g., via pretrial motion,142 at trial, or post-trial 
motions); and (3) whether a jury or a judge decided willfulness.143 If willful 
infringement was found, two additional variables were coded: (4) whether 
enhanced damages were awarded144 and (5) the amount of enhanced 
 
 135. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 107, at 259 (finding approximately 80% of patent cases 
are disposed of through settlement). 
 136. Id. at 258, 273 tbls.4 & 5, 274 tbl.6; see also Paul M. Janicke, Patent Jury Verdicts: Myths 
and Realities, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2007, at 18. 
 137. Kesan & Ball, supra note 107, at 275 tbl.7 (finding infringement in only a slight 
majority—53%—of cases decided at trial). 
 138. Id. at 276 tbl.8 (finding invalidity in 19% of cases decided at trial). 
 139. Moore, supra note 6, at 234. 
 140. In empirical research, written coding instructions are needed so all coders apply the 
same criteria for each coding decision. This helps promote consistency in coding and serves as 
“a check against looking, consciously or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.” Hall 
& Wright, supra note 109, at 81; see also Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321, 325 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2005) 
(explaining that “the overriding goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment—to leave 
as little as possible to interpretation”). In addition, written coding instructions are necessary 
“because the scientific standard of replicability requires a written record of how categories were 
defined and applied.” Hall & Wright, supra note 109, at 109. The coding instructions for this 
study and the resulting dataset will be made publicly available. 
 141. This was actually recorded as two separate variables in the dataset: the “initial” decision 
on willfulness, and the “final” decision on willfulness. For most cases, these variables were coded 
the same. In some cases, however—most commonly, if the jury found willfulness at trial, but this 
decision was overturned by the district court on post-trial motions—the final decision differed 
from the initial one. See, e.g., Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 723 
F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1323–25 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 
692 F. Supp. 2d 487, 503–05 (M.D. Pa. 2010); TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 
578–79 (E.D. Tex. 2007). For these cases, the final decision (e.g., grant of JMOL of no 
willfulness) was used. 
 142. “Pretrial motions” include motions for summary judgment under Rule 56, as well as 
Rule 12 motions, if the motion resulted in a final decision on willfulness (e.g., summary 
judgment of no willfulness). See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 143. This variable is most useful in evaluating potential differences between juries and 
judges as finders of fact on the issue of willfulness at trial. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 144. As previously explained, whether to award enhanced damages for willful infringement 
is an issue reserved for the district court. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. 
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damages awarded, as compared to compensatory damages.145 Finally, two 
dummy variables were included: (6) whether the final decision on 
willfulness occurred before or after Seagate and (7) whether the decision to 
award enhanced damages (and if so, how much) was made before or after 
Seagate. 
The study also sought to determine the effect of several common factors 
on willfulness decisions after Seagate. A tentative list of factors was developed 
after a review of post-Seagate case law and secondary sources.146 These factors 
were: (1) reliance on an opinion of counsel as a defense to willfulness; (2) 
the existence of a “substantial” or “legitimate” defense to infringement; (3) 
evidence of copying by the accused infringer; (4) evidence that the accused 
infringer attempted to design around the patent; (5) reexamination of at 
least one patent-in-suit by the PTO; and (6) bifurcation of the issue of 
willfulness at trial. For this latter group of variables, the post-Seagate 
willfulness decisions—172 in total—were examined in more detail. 
Sufficient information was available to fully code 136 cases, or 
approximately 80% (79.1%) of all post-Seagate willfulness decisions. 
Before reaching a coding decision for this latter group of variables, all 
judicial opinions on willfulness and enhanced damages, as well as electronic 
docket information and relevant court filings, were reviewed. For example, 
the author found it was often useful to examine the parties’ post-trial briefs 
on willfulness and enhanced damages, which summarized the evidence and 
arguments presented at trial on these issues. Trial transcripts were also 
 
Cir. 1992), abrogated in part by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
 145. The following formula was used to express this ratio: (enhanced damages + compensatory 
damages) / compensatory damages. When enhanced damages were awarded, the ratio ranged 
between one and three (for full trebling of damages). For example, if the patentee was awarded 
$200 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $40 million in enhanced damages, 
the ratio would be 1.2:1. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568, 596 (E.D. 
Tex.), aff’d as modified, 589 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2009), opinion withdrawn and superseded by 598 
F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 146. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(mentioning the infringer’s reasonable belief that it had “substantial defenses to a claim of 
infringement” and had “attempt[ed] to design around” the patent as potential defenses to 
willfulness), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic 
Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “evidence of copying 
. . . is relevant only to Seagate’s second prong”); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 
1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.) (“[An] opinion of counsel concluding either that [the accused 
infringer] did not infringe the . . . patent or that it was invalid would provide a sufficient basis 
for [the accused infringer] to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless behavior . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1070 (2008); Safoco, Inc. v. Cameron Int’l Corp., 
No. H-05-0739, 2009 WL 2424108, at *19 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2009) (finding that “the granting 
of a reexamination request by the USPTO is . . . one factor among others that should be 
considered in evaluating a claim for willful infringement”); Prati, supra note 60, at 67 (listing 
“deliberate copying” and the “closeness of the case” as factors likely affecting willfulness after 
Seagate). 
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reviewed when they were available electronically. Finally, the PTO’s Public 
Patent Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) website was reviewed for 
data on reexaminations.147 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This Part describes the results from the dataset of willful infringement 
decisions and enhanced-damages awards during the full study period, as well 
as the post-Seagate decisions that were examined in more detail. It analyzes 
these results and offers some tentative conclusions about the realities of 
willful infringement and enhanced damages both before and after Seagate. 
The analysis below contends that certain results are statistically 
significant. Statistical significance is the probability that an observed 
relationship is not due to chance.148 A p-value of less than 0.05 is usually 
“considered statistically significant because it indicates that the probability 
that the results are due to chance is less than five percent.”149 Results with a 
p-value of less than 0.01 are considered highly statistically significant.150 All 
data analysis was conducted using Stata/IC 11.2. 
A. WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT 
1. Seagate Resulted in More Summary Judgment Decisions on Willfulness 
One key issue is the procedural posture for deciding willfulness after 
Seagate. Judge Moore’s study found that prior to 2000, “[w]illfulness was only 
decided if and when the case went to trial. Willfulness was never decided on 
summary judgment.”151 After Seagate, however, commentators predicted 
many willfulness claims would be resolved before trial because its “objective 
recklessness” standard would be more difficult for patentees to satisfy, and 
thus, more likely to be resolved through pretrial motions.152 Indeed, Seagate 
 
 147. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
 148. See, e.g., Elementary Statistics Concepts, STATSOFT, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/ 
elementary-concepts-in-statistics (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (“The statistical significance of a 
result is the probability that the observed relationship (e.g., between variables) . . . occurred by 
pure chance.”). 
 149. Petherbridge, supra note 107, at 1384. In the tables and charts below, statistically 
significant results are indicated with a single asterisk (*). 
 150. In the tables and charts below, highly statistically significant results are indicated with 
two asterisks (**). 
 151. Moore, supra note 6, at 234. 
 152. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 105 (“Prior to Seagate, parties would seldom move for 
summary judgment on the issue of willfulness, and courts would even less frequently grant these 
motions. . . . Now, however, it is becoming more routine for accused infringers to move for 
summary judgment of no willful infringement prior to trial, and courts are actually granting 
these motions . . . .”); Justin McCarthy, Note, In Re Seagate: One Step Closer to a Rational Doctrine, 
10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 355, 384 (2009) (asserting that because Seagate’s objective 
recklessness standard “is more difficult for plaintiffs to meet, it would be expected that the 
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itself suggests that a bare-bones willfulness allegation would be vulnerable to 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, stating that “when a complaint is filed, a patentee 
must have a good faith basis for alleging willful infringement.”153 
Furthermore, some observers suggested Seagate would result in more post-
trial grants of JMOL overturning jury verdicts of willfulness.154 
 
Figures 1 and 2: Procedural Posture for Deciding Willfulness 
 
Figure 1 (on the left-hand side) illustrates the procedural posture for 
deciding willfulness in the three-year period before Seagate. Over three-
quarters (76.6%) of willfulness decisions were made at trial. An additional 
6.6% of final decisions were reached in a post-trial motion, usually via a 
renewed motion for JMOL of no willfulness under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50(b). As a result, the vast majority of willfulness decisions were 
made during or after trial. Only 16.8% of cases decided willfulness on 
pretrial motions. While this amount of pretrial decisions was relatively small, 
it represented a substantial increase from Judge Moore’s study.155 
 
amount of summary judgment rulings early in the patent litigation process would increase to 
dispose of the willful infringement counts”). 
 153. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing FED. 
R. CIV. P. 8, 11(b)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008); see also Damon C. Andrews, Note, Iqbal-
ing Seagate: Plausibility Pleading of Willful Patent Infringement, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1955, 1966 
(2010) (discussing Iqbal’s effect on willfulness findings in patent infringement cases). 
 154. See Bernstein, supra note 105 (claiming “courts are frequently reversing jury verdicts of 
willful infringement” after Seagate and “[t]he increase in the filing and granting of [post-trial] 
motions should continue”). 
 155. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2 (on the right-hand side) illustrates the procedural posture for 
deciding willfulness after Seagate. For this time period, willfulness was 
decided through pretrial motions in over one-quarter (26.9%) of all cases. 
However, even after Seagate, willfulness is usually still decided at trial (64.9% 
of the time). There is also a slight uptick in the number of post-trial 
willfulness decisions, to 8.2%, usually through a renewed motion for JMOL 
of no willfulness.156 Thus, while most commentators accurately predicted 
there would be more pretrial decisions on willfulness after Seagate, willful 
infringement is usually still decided at trial. 
2. Seagate and Willfulness Findings 
Another key hypothesis for testing was whether Seagate had a significant 
impact on willfulness decisions. As previously discussed, many patent 
litigators and scholars contended that Seagate’s “objective recklessness” 
standard would result in substantially fewer willfulness findings.157 One can 
empirically test this hypothesis by comparing willful infringement decisions 
in the district courts before and after Seagate, using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) 
test to determine whether any observed difference is statistically significant. 
 
 Before Seagate 
(Sept. 2004–Aug. 2007) 
After Seagate 
(Aug. 2007–July 2010) 
% Willful 48.2% (66 of 137) 
37.2% 
(64 of 172) 
p = 0.052 
Table 1: Willfulness Findings Before and After Seagate 
 
As shown in Table 1, during the pre-Seagate period (September 2004–
August 2007), willful infringement was found in just under a majority of 
cases (48.2%). In contrast, after Seagate (August 2007–July 2010), willful 
infringement was found almost 40% of the time (37.2%). This means that 
willfulness was found in approximately 10% (11.0%) fewer cases after 
Seagate. Notably, this difference was not found to be statistically significant, 
although the p-value is close to the 0.05 significance threshold (p = 0.052). 
As a result, the null hypothesis—that the decline in willfulness findings after 
Seagate was due to chance—cannot be definitively rejected.158 
 
 156. This Figure omits one decision where the accused infringer stopped disputing an 
allegation of willful infringement shortly before trial, but continued to contest other issues, 
including validity of the patent-in-suit. See Joyal Prods., Inc. v. Johnson Electric N. Am., Inc., No. 
04-5172(JAP), 2009 WL 512156 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009), aff’d, 335 F. App’x 48 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 157. See supra text accompanying notes 97104. 
 158. It is unclear whether additional data (i.e., willfulness decisions after July 2010) might 
alter this conclusion. However, there have been a number of additional willfulness findings 
since the end of the study period. See, e.g., Judgment, Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., No. 
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One potential counterargument is that Seagate does have an important 
impact on willfulness, but this impact cannot be fully measured by litigation 
decisions due to selection effects. “In general, ‘[t]he selection effect refers 
to the proposition that the selection of tried cases is not a random sample of 
the mass of underlying cases.’”159 This is because “[c]ases only go to trial 
when the parties substantially disagree on the predicted outcome.”160 
Rational parties consider all available information regarding their likelihood 
of success on a claim, including the applicable legal precedent, and adjust 
their expectations accordingly.161 When the applicable legal standard clearly 
favors one side or the other, parties tend to settle their disputes rather than 
incur the expense of litigation.162 In contrast, “[d]ifficult cases falling close 
to the applicable legal standard tend not to settle, because the parties are 
more likely to disagree substantially in their predicted outcomes.”163 As a 
result, “the disputes selected for litigation . . . will constitute neither a 
random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes.”164 
However, selection effects may not play an important role regarding 
willfulness for several reasons. First, previous empirical studies have found 
that before Seagate, patentees claimed willfulness in the overwhelming 
majority of cases.165 Anecdotal evidence suggests that willfulness is still 
 
04-00019-MO (D. Or. July 30, 2011); Jury Verdict, Convolve, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-244-
CE (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2011); Jury Verdict, Fractus S.A. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 6:09-CV-203 
(E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011); Jury Verdict, Peach State Labs, Inc. v. Envtl. Mfg. Solutions, L.L.C., 
No. 6:09-cv-395-Orl-28DAB (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2011); Final Judgment, FURminator, Inc. v. 
Kim Laube & Co., No. 4:08CV00367 ERW (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2011); Jury Special Verdict, 
Accentra Inc. v. Staples, Inc., No. CV 07-5862 ABC (R Zx) (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011); 
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Bendix Commercial Vehicle Sys., L.L.C. v. Haldex Brake 
Prods. Corp., No. 1:09CV176, 2011 WL 9347 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2011) (refusing to overturn 
September 2010 jury finding of willfulness); Jury Verdict, Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Biolitec, Inc., 
Nos. C08-04234 MMC, C08-03129 MMC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010); Verdict Sheet, Metso 
Minerals, Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distribution Ltd., No. CV 06-01446 (ADS) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 
2010). 
 159. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending 
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Theodore 
Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 337, 337 (1990)). For the seminal article on the “selection effect,” see George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 160. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 159, at 1129. 
 161. Priest & Klein, supra note 159, at 4. 
 162. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 159, at 1129. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Priest & Klein, supra note 159, at 4. 
 165. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421, 1440–42 (2009) (finding that willfulness was alleged 81% of the time in a random 
sampling of patent cases in the District of Delaware and Eastern District of Texas between 
January 2000 and May 2007); Moore, supra note 6, at 232 (finding that willfulness was asserted 
by the patentee in 92% of all patent cases from 1999–2000). 
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routinely alleged after Seagate,166 so long as the patentee has a 
nonsanctionable basis for doing so.167 This is because, for a patentee, the 
possibility of a willfulness finding and an enhanced-damages award is a low-
risk, high-reward proposition. Even if the likelihood of success is relatively 
low, patentees will still allege and pursue willfulness claims because the 
potential benefit—up to triple damages—is quite large. Indeed, selection-
effects theory recognizes that when there are asymmetric stakes that favor 
the plaintiff, “litigation is . . . likely [even when] the plaintiff has a small 
probability of winning.”168 Thus, a patentee has little incentive to not pursue 
a potentially viable willfulness claim.169 
Further, the dataset itself tends to rebut the claim that selection effects 
substantially alter parties’ behavior about litigating willfulness. If a large 
selection effect existed, one would expect to see significantly fewer willfulness 
decisions in litigation after Seagate, as patentees would not pursue claims that 
might have succeeded under the old “affirmative duty of due care” standard 
but were no longer viable after Seagate. In fact, however, the dataset reveals 
the exact opposite—there was an increase in the number of willfulness 
decisions after Seagate. This study identified 137 cases as deciding willfulness 
in the pre-Seagate period (September 2004–August 2007). In contrast, 172 
cases were identified in the same time period after Seagate.170 Indeed, the 
post-Seagate cohort remains larger on a percentage basis after accounting for 
the relative amount of patent litigation filed during each time period.171 
 
 166. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 104, at 13 (“Anecdotal evidence indicates that more 
than 90 percent of patent cases continue to involve allegations of willful infringement[, even] 
. . . after Seagate.”); Randy R. Micheletti, Note, Willful Patent Infringement After In Re Seagate: Just 
What Is “Objectively Reckless” Infringement?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 975, 975 (2010) (noting that 
“willfulness is alleged in nearly all patent infringement suits”). 
 167. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding 
that “a patentee must have a good faith basis for alleging willful infringement” in a complaint 
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008). To the author’s knowledge, there 
has been no decision imposing Rule 11 sanctions on a patentee for lacking a good-faith basis to 
claim willfulness since Seagate. Interestingly, however, the Northern District of California has 
imposed mandatory disclosure obligations early in litigation for patentees claiming willfulness. 
See N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 3-1(h) (2010) (providing that a party claiming willful infringement 
must disclose “the basis for such allegation” within fourteen days after the initial case-
management conference). But see Andrews, supra note 153, at 1985 (arguing that pleading 
willfulness after Iqbal “will almost certainly be beyond the reach of most [patentees]” who are 
armed with “only limited knowledge of [the] defendant’s allegedly infringing device,” let alone 
his “conduct leading up to his decision to manufacture that device”). 
 168. Priest & Klein, supra note 159, at 25. 
 169. It is possible, however, that a patentee might agree to drop a relatively weak willfulness 
claim in exchange for concessions from the accused infringer during litigation. 
 170. However, part of this increase was due to several post-Seagate district court decisions 
that granted JMOL of no willfulness which overturned a pre-Seagate jury verdict of willfulness. 
 171. A decision on willfulness was reached in approximately 1.6% of patent cases before 
Seagate, and in 2.1% of patent cases after Seagate. See supra note 134 for data on patent cases 
filed during each time period. 
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As an alternative hypothesis, the author also examined whether the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse172 in 2004, which eliminated the 
“adverse inference” rule for an accused infringer’s failure to obtain or 
disclose an opinion of counsel, might have had a significant impact on 
willfulness decisions. For this comparison, the author used the data from 
Judge Moore’s previous study, which found willfulness 63.8% of the time the 
issue was decided from 1983–1999, as a proxy for all pre-Knorr-Bremse 
decisions.173 
 









% Willful 63.8%** (349 of 547) 
48.2%** 
(66 of 137) 
37.2%** 
(64 of 172) 
p = 0.000 
Table 2: Willfulness Findings: Knorr-Bremse and Seagate 
 
As depicted in Table 2, there is a substantial decline in willfulness 
findings over the three time periods (64% to 48% to 37%). Furthermore, 
this cumulative difference is highly statistically significant (p = 0.000). As a 
result, the cumulative impact of the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Knorr-
Bremse and Seagate, rather than Seagate alone, may account for the decrease 
in willfulness findings since 1999.  Indeed, it may be possible that Knorr-
Bremse had a larger impact than Seagate on willfulness decisions, as there is 
highly statistically significant difference (p=0.001) between the pre-2000 
willfulness decisions identified in Judge Moore's study compared with the 
post-Knorr-Bremse, pre-Seagate decisions collected in this dataset. 
3. Jury Versus Judge on Willfulness 
Another important issue is whether willfulness findings varied 
depending on whether the decisionmaker was a jury or a judge. In Judge 
Moore’s study, willfulness was found in 67.7% of jury trials and 52.6% of 
bench trials from 1983 and 2000.174 This study sought to determine whether 
a similar pattern existed after the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Knorr-Bremse 
and Seagate, respectively. 
 
 
 172. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 173. Moore, supra note 59, at 390 & tbl.4 (noting that willfulness was found in 349 of 547 
patent trials that decided the issue from 1983 to 1999). 
 174. Moore, supra note 6, at 237; see also Moore, supra note 59, at 390, 393 & tbl.4 (finding 
that, from 1983 to 1999, juries found willfulness 71% of the time, compared to 53% for 
judges). 
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% Willful Before Seagate (Sept. 2004–Aug. 2007) 
After Seagate 
(Aug. 2007–July 2010) 
Jury 60.9% (56 of 92) 
61.9% 
(52 of 84) 
Judge 53.9% (7 of 13) 
18.5%** 
(5 of 27) 
 p = 0.628 p = 0.000 
Table 3: Willfulness Decisions at Trial175: Jury vs. Judge 
 
Table 3 shows that the pre-Seagate willfulness decisions closely follow the 
pattern observed by Judge Moore: at trial, juries found willfulness at higher 
rates than judges did, but not dramatically so. Before Seagate, juries found 
willfulness about 60% of the time, while judges found willfulness about 54% 
of the time. This difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.628) using 
Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test. 
The more surprising result occurred in the post-Seagate cases. When a 
jury was the decisionmaker at trial, willfulness was found about 62% of the 
time—almost identical to pre-Seagate. When a judge decided willfulness at 
trial, however, willfulness was found much less often: less than one in five 
cases (19%). This difference was highly statistically significant (p = 0.000) 
using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test, suggesting that the difference was not 
due to chance alone. 
Part of this result is due to an increase in district-court decisions 
granting motions for JMOL during trial on willfulness after Seagate. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides that a district court may grant JMOL 
“at any time before the case is submitted to the jury” “[i]f a party has been 
fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a 
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find 
for the party on that issue.”176 Under the coding instructions, a court’s 
decision to grant JMOL before verdict at trial was classified as a judicial 
decision—because the judge determined there was no willfulness—even 
though the rest of the issues in the case may have been decided by a jury. All 
of the post-Seagate, pre-verdict JMOL decisions found no willfulness. 
However, these pre-verdict JMOL decisions, by themselves, likely cannot 
account for the much lower rate of willfulness findings by judges after 
Seagate. If pre-verdict JMOL decisions are excluded from the dataset (11 of 
27 cases), willful infringement was still found in less than a third (31.3%) of 
all bench trials, which remains statistically significant (p = 0.024). 
 
 175. Excluded from this table are eight cases (three pre-Seagate and five post-Seagate) where 
willfulness was found through pretrial motions and one post-Seagate case where willful 
infringement was found for products sold after trial. 
 176. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). 
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An alternative explanation is that judges and juries have a very different 
understanding of what conduct is “willful” after Seagate. Federal judges 
typically have decades of legal experience before being appointed to the 
bench and are sensitive to the meaning of legal words and phrases.177 As a 
result, they understand that objective recklessness requires a significantly 
higher degree of culpability than a negligence-like standard, like the one 
articulated in Underwater Devices.178 Furthermore, because patent cases are 
concentrated in a relatively small number of districts,179 judges—unlike 
jurors—are often “repeat players” in patent litigation and may better 
understand the higher burden of proof imposed by Seagate.180 
In contrast, decades of empirical research have demonstrated that lay 
jurors frequently have difficulty understanding “legal jargon” and “legal 
terms of art,”181 particularly in complex litigation.182 Thus, many jurors may 
be unable to comprehend a difference between an infringer’s failure to 
 
 177. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 460 (2006) (explaining that “years of schooling and practice” make 
judges sensitive to legal language). For example, virtually all law students learn the difference 
between recklessness and negligence in the context of a first-year criminal law class. 
 178. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“[T]he 
duty of care announced in Underwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that 
is more akin to negligence.”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 179. See, e.g., KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK, PATENT 
LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 93–101 (3d ed. 2008) (finding that between 2000 and 2006, the top 
ten district courts for patent litigation had 47% of all patent cases, but only 29% of all civil 
litigation during that time); Courts, LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com/courts?filter=Patent 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (finding that the top seven districts for patent litigation—the 
Southern District of New York, the District of Delaware, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern 
District of Texas, the Northern District of Illinois, the Northern District of California, and the 
Central District of California—had 49.7% of all patent cases filed in 2009). 
 180. See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System 
Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1093 (2003) (“While judges can develop a reputation in the 
patent trial arena” through repeated experience adjudicating patent cases, “juries are one-shot 
players.”). But cf. Schwartz, supra note 107, at 254–56 (finding that judicial experience with 
patent cases does not result in a lower reversal rate on claim construction issues by the Federal 
Circuit). 
 181. Marder, supra note 177, at 451, 454; see also Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What 
Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 137, 151 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (explaining that “[a] growing body of studies 
indicates that some jurors may fail to comprehend as much as 50 percent of the judge’s 
instructions”). See generally Marder, supra note 177, at 454–58 (providing an overview of 
empirical studies demonstrating that “jurors have difficulty understanding jury instructions”). 
 182. See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 197 (1990) (“One type of case in which juries have appeared to 
function deficiently is the complex civil lawsuit. In such a case, the complexity of the issues may 
prevent the jury from fully understanding the applicable rules and principles . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)); Matthew A. Reiber & Jill D. Weinberg, The Complexity of Complexity: An Empirical Study 
of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 967 (2010) (“[J]uror comprehension 
decreases as complexity increases, even among relatively well-educated jurors with prior jury 
experience.”). 
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satisfy an “affirmative duty of due care” and acting with recklessness 
regarding the patentee’s rights. 
Furthermore, this issue may be exacerbated by existing model patent 
jury instructions on willfulness, which are lengthy, structurally complex, and 
contain legal jargon. For example, the Model Patent Jury Instructions 
promulgated by the National Jury Instruction Project explain “objective 
recklessness” as follows: 
 To prove willful infringement, [the patent holder] must 
persuade you that it is highly probable that [before the filing date 
of the complaint], [the alleged infringer] acted with reckless 
disregard of the claims of [the patent holder]’s patent. To show 
“reckless disregard,” [the patent holder] must satisfy a two-part test: 
the first concerns [the alleged infringer]’s conduct, the second 
concerns [the alleged infringer]’s state of mind. 
 When considering [the alleged infringer]’s conduct, you must 
decide whether [the patent holder] has proven it is highly 
probable that [the alleged infringer]’s conduct was reckless; that is, 
that [the alleged infringer] proceeded with the allegedly infringing 
conduct with knowledge of the patent, and in the face of an 
unjustifiably high risk that it was infringing the claims of a valid and 
enforceable patent. Because this is an objective issue, the state of 
mind of [the alleged infringer] is not relevant to it. Legitimate or 
credible defenses to infringement, even if ultimately not successful, 
demonstrate a lack of recklessness. 
 If you conclude that [the patent holder] has proven that [the 
alleged infringer]’s conduct was reckless, then you need to 
consider the second part of the test. You must determine whether 
[the patent holder] proved it is highly probable that the 
unjustifiably high risk of infringement was known or so obvious 
that it should have been known to [the alleged infringer]. In 
deciding whether [the alleged infringer] satisfied the state-of-mind 
part of the test, you should consider all facts surrounding the 
alleged infringement including, but not limited to, the following: 
1.  whether [the alleged infringer] acted in a manner 
consistent with the standards of commerce for its industry; 
2.  whether [the alleged infringer] intentionally copied 
without a reasonable basis a product [method] of [the 
patent holder] covered by one or more claims of the 
patent, as distinguished from trying to “design around” the 
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patent by designing a product [method] that [the alleged 
infringer] believed did not infringe those claims.183 
Readability tests provide one indication of the difficulty jurors may face 
in understanding such instructions. Using the Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level 
test,184 which assigns a readability number based on an average student at a 
grade level,185 the willfulness instruction quoted above has a grade level of 
15.8; in other words, it requires the education level of almost an average 
college senior to comprehend it.186 Similar model jury instructions adopted 
by the Northern District of California and the Federal Circuit Bar 
Association are of a comparable degree of difficulty.187 And this problem 
may be compounded because a jury must simultaneously attempt to 
understand instructions on other complex patent law issues, such as 
infringement, invalidity, and damages.188 
Faced with such confusing and difficult-to-understand instructions, 
juries instead may view willfulness as whether the defendant was “wrong” in 
infringing the patent. As Judge Moore has suggested, juries may be easily 
swayed by claims that an accused infringer was a wrongdoer who should be 
punished for “stealing” the patentee’s invention: 
Juries may perceive the patentee who brings an infringement 
action as a victim and an infringer accused of stealing patented 
 
 183. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.1 (Nat’l Jury Instruction Project 2009) 
(footnotes omitted), available at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/ 
NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf. The quoted portion omits the first two paragraphs of the 
instruction, which introduces the jury to willfulness’s role in patent litigation. 
 184. See Test Your Document’s Readability, MICROSOFT OFFICE, http://office.microsoft.com/ 
en-us/word-help/test-your-document-s-readability-HP010148506.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 
2011). 
 185. Id. (“For example, a score of 8.0 means that an eighth grader can understand the 
document.”). 
 186. The Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level test scores for all jury instructions referenced in this 
article were calculated using Microsoft Word 2007. See id. 
 187. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE N. DIST. OF CALIFORNIA § 3.11 at 22–23 
(2007), available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/5/Model-Patent-JuryInstructions. 
pdf (Flesch–Kinkaid Grade Level test of 13.7; Flesch Reading Score of 37.1); MODEL PATENT 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.8 at 45–46 (Fed. Circuit Bar Ass’n, Feb. 18, 2010), available at http:// 
memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9008/Library/FCBAModelJury%20Instru
ctions%20February%2018%202010.pdf (Flesch–Kinkaid Grade Level test of 13.9; Flesch 
Reading Score of 38.0) [hereinafter FED. CIR. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. Only the 
Seventh Circuit’s model instruction on willfulness, which is noticeably shorter and contains less 
“legalese,” scores significantly better for readability. See JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT § 11.2.14 at 226–27 (Comm. on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 
2009), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf 
(Flesch–Kinkaid Grade Level test of 10.6; Flesch Reading Score of 46.5). 
 188. Cf. John C. Lowe, Reinventing an Outdated Wheel: Innovations in Complex Litigation, 2 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 6 ¶ 31 (1997) (asserting that the problem of traditional jury instructions “often is 
compounded by a judge reading the voluminous instructions . . . to the panel of bored, 
impatient, and uninterested jurors”). 
A2 - SEAMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:36 PM 
2012] WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT & ENHANCED DAMAGES 449 
technology, a villain. To find willfulness, the factfinder must 
conclude that the infringer intentionally or flagrantly disregarded 
the patentee’s rights. The outcome data indicate that juries are 
more easily persuaded than judges by “bad guy” evidence.189 
Ultimately, the difference between jury and judge decisions on willfulness 
after Seagate “suggests that juries may harbor (as borne out by the outcome 
data) the popularly perceived bias in favor of the patent holder” compared 
to judges.190 
4. Venue and Willfulness 
Another issue studied was whether willfulness findings varied 
depending on venue. Venue can be an important, even decisive, issue in 
patent litigation. In patent cases, for a corporate defendant—the most 
common target of an infringement suit—venue is proper “in any judicial 
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is 
commenced,”191 granting patentees a wide variety of choices about where to 
sue.192 Patentees frequently engage in forum shopping by filing suit in 
districts that are perceived as favorable. And at least until recently,193 
motions to transfer patent cases from one district to another were not 
frequently granted, particularly in the Eastern District of Texas, “because 
courts g[a]ve substantial deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.”194 
For instance, the Eastern District of Texas—a district with no major 
metropolitan areas195 and relatively few high-technology companies or 
 
 189. Moore, supra note 59, at 393. 
 190. Id. 
 191. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2006); see also VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 
917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[V]enue in a patent infringement case includes any 
district where there would be personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant at the time the 
action is commenced.”). 
 192. See Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 107, at 901 (“With . . . lax jurisdiction and venue 
requirements, plaintiffs in patent cases have an unfettered choice of where to bring suit.”). 
 193. There has been an increase in the transfer of patent litigation out of the Eastern 
District of Texas—a preferred forum for many patentees, particularly nonpracticing entities 
(“NPEs”)—since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304 
(5th Cir. 2008), and the Federal Circuit’s decision in In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). See, e.g., On Semiconductor Corp. v. Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-
390, 2010 WL 3855520, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010) (granting motion to transfer venue to 
the Northern District of California); HTI IP LLC v. DriveOk, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-370, 2010 WL 
3075200, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2010) (granting motion to transfer venue to the Southern 
District of California); Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004 (E.D. Tex. 2009) 
(granting motion to transfer venue to the District of Oregon). 
 194. Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 107, at 897. 
 195. 28 U.S.C. § 124(c) (2006) (listing the counties located in the Eastern District of 
Texas). The largest metropolitan area wholly within the Eastern District of Texas, the 
Beaumont–Port Arthur Metropolitan Statistical Area, was ranked 133rd nationally with an 
estimated population of approximately 378,000 in 2009. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 26 tbl.20 (2011), available at http://www.census. 
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research firms—has become one of the top districts for filing patent suits.196 
Patentees, especially nonpracticing entities, often file suit in the Eastern 
District of Texas due to a combination of allegedly favorable attributes, 
including special patent rules designed to complete all discovery within nine 
months, judges that rarely grant dispositive pretrial motions, and plaintiff-
friendly juries with a history of large damages awards.197 In contrast, accused 
infringers prefer forums with a slower average time to trial and a larger pool 
of technologically sophisticated jurors, such as the Northern District of 
California.198 
Previous studies have found a statistically significant difference between 
districts for other important issues in patent litigation. For example, Judge 
Moore found there were statistically significant differences between districts 
on findings of infringement and validity.199 She also found some variation in 
willful infringement findings among districts with a large number of patent 
cases, with a high of 85% in the Northern District of Illinois and a low of 













gov/prod/2011pubs/11statab/pop.pdf. Many northern suburbs of Dallas/Forth Worth are 
located within the Eastern District of Texas, but this region (the Sherman Division) handles 
relatively few patent cases compared to the more sparsely populated Marshall and Tyler 
Divisions. See Mary Alice Robbins, Eastern District Rocket Docket Decelerates in Marshall  
Division, TEXAS LAWYER (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id= 
1202423817064&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (noting that in 2007, 232 patent cases were filed in 
the Marshall Division, compared to eight in the Sherman Division). 
 196. See LEX MACHINA, supra note 179 (showing that the Eastern District of Texas was the 
top district for new patent cases in 2006, 2007, and 2008, and was second in 2009). 
 197. E.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric 
Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 
193 (2007); Michael C. Smith, Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases, 
69 TEX. B.J. 1045 (2006). 
 198. See Mark A. Lemley, Where To File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 403 (2010) (“A 
[patent infringement] defendant’s ideal jurisdiction is one that regularly rules for defendants, 
is unlikely to send cases to jury trial, and takes a long time to do both.”). 
 199. Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 107, at 919 & tbl.10. 
 200. Id. at 919 tbl.10. 
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District % Willful Decisions (n) p-value 
Eastern District of Texas 52.3% 44 0.139 
Northern District of Illinois 46.2% 13 0.761 
Northern District of 
California 43.8% 16 0.889 
District of Delaware 43.3% 30 0.883 
National Average 42.1%   
Eastern District of Virginia 36.4% 10 0.766 
District of New Jersey 35.7% 14 0.784 
Central District of California 30.8% 13 0.568 
District of Massachusetts 30.0% 10 0.528 
Western District of Wisconsin 30.0% 10 0.528 
District of Minnesota 27.3% 11 0.368 
Table 4: Willfulness Decisions by District, Sept. 2004–July 2010 (10 
minimum) 
 
Table 4 contains data on willfulness decisions for all districts with at 
least ten decisions during the entire study period (both before and after 
Seagate). There was some variation in the percentage of willfulness findings 
among various districts, from a high of over 50% in the Eastern District of 
Texas (52.3%) to approximately 27% in the District of Minnesota. However, 
none of these differences were statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
Two interesting findings may explain why the Eastern District of Texas 
had the highest percentage of willfulness determinations. First, in that 
district, willfulness was rarely decided before trial: only 7% of willfulness 
claims (3 of 44 cases) were decided by pretrial motions, compared to 25% 
of the time (66 of 264 cases) in the rest of the country. This difference was 
statistically significant (p = 0.014). In addition, juries made the final decision 
on willfulness over 70% of the time in the Eastern District of Texas (72.7%, 
32 of 44 cases), compared to just over half (54.3%, 144 of 265 cases) 
elsewhere. This difference was significant as well (p = 0.023). 
B. FACTORS AFFECTING WILLFULNESS FINDINGS 
Another major research question was how some common factors 
affected willfulness decisions after Seagate. As previously discussed, the 
author reviewed case law and secondary sources and identified six factors as 
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potentially relevant to willfulness findings after Seagate.201 A statistical test 
called multiple logistic (“logit”) regression202 was used to determine each 
factor’s impact on the dependent variable, which was the final decision on 
willfulness. The results of this regression analysis are reported in Table 5. 
 
Factor Odds Ratio Std. Error p-value 
Opinion of Counsel 0.712 0.347  0.486 
Substantial Defense 0.124 0.067  0.000** 
Copying 3.365 1.389  0.003** 
Design Around 1.230 0.628  0.686 
Reexamination 1.080 0.365  0.819 
Bifurcation203 0.553 0.346  0.343 
n = 136 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1924 
Table 5: Factors Affecting Willfulness After Seagate 
 
As Table 5 indicates, only two factors were highly statistically significant 
for willfulness decisions. First, a substantial defense to infringement was 
highly correlated with a finding of no willfulness. In contrast, evidence of 
copying was highly correlated with a finding of willfulness. The remaining 
factors—offering an opinion of counsel, evidence of an attempted design-
around, reexamination of at least one patent-in-suit, and bifurcating 
willfulness from liability at trial—did not have a statistically significant 
relationship with willfulness decisions. The data analysis and implications for 
each factor are discussed in greater detail in the following Subparts. 
 
 201. See supra Part III.B (identifying as potentially relevant factors: (1) opinions of counsel; 
(2) “substantial” or “legitimate” defense to infringement; (3) evidence of copying; (4) evidence 
of an attempted design around; (5) reexamination of the patent(s)-in-suit; and (6) bifurcation 
of willfulness). 
 202. Logistic regression is “an estimation technique . . . commonly used by legal scholars 
and others to analyze” the relationship between several independent explanatory variables and 
a single dichotomous (i.e., binary) dependent variable. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The 
Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1125, 1179–87 (1999). 
 203. Because a significant number of cases (thirty-four) were resolved before trial and thus 
did not involve bifurcation, a separate logistic regression for bifurcation was conducted that 
only involved cases that reached trial (i.e., the final decision on willfulness was at trial or on 
post-trial motions). Bifurcation was omitted from the logistic regression that resulted in the 
Pseudo R2 value reported in Table 5. 
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1. Opinions of Counsel 
One of the most commonly cited factors for determining willfulness is 
whether the accused infringer obtained an opinion of counsel. Although 
Seagate eliminated the affirmative duty to obtain an opinion, the Federal 
Circuit’s post-Seagate decisions confirm that a competent opinion of counsel 
on noninfringement or invalidity can be used to defend against 
willfulness.204 Further, some district courts have held that the absence of an 
opinion of counsel is “still a factor the jury can consider when applying the 
‘totality of the circumstances’ approach with respect to willfulness of 
infringement,” even if it no longer creates an adverse inference.205 Finally, 
some model patent jury instructions explicitly inform the jury it may 
consider an opinion of counsel in determining whether the accused 
infringer was objectively reckless.206 
 
 204. See Aspex Eyewear Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 605 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(“[A]n opinion of counsel may be relevant to the issue of willful infringement, for timely 
consultation with counsel may be evidence that an infringer did not engage in objectively 
reckless behavior.”); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.) 
(“[C]ompetent opinion of counsel concluding either that [the accused infringer] did not 
infringe the . . . patent or that it was invalid would provide a sufficient basis for [the accused 
infringer] to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless behavior.”), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 
1070 (2008). 
 205. Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp. 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 
1325 (S.D. Cal. 2010); see also Finjan Software, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., No. 06-369, 
2009 WL 2524495, at *15 (D. Del. Aug. 18, 2009) (“While there is no longer an affirmative 
duty of care that requires an accused infringer to obtain an opinion of counsel, the fact that 
[the alleged infringer] did not seek any such opinion may be considered in the totality of 
circumstances surrounding willful infringement.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Finjan, Inc. 
v. Secure Computing Corp., 625 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Creative Internet Adver. Corp. v. 
Yahoo! Inc., No. 6:07cv354, 2009 WL 2382132, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2009) (“[T]he lack of 
opinion of counsel is one factor of many that the jury could have taken into account in 
determining whether Defendant willfully infringed.”); Franklin Electric Co. v. Dover Corp., No. 
05-CV-598-S, 2007 WL 5067678, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 15, 2007) (“[D]efendant’s failure to 
seek advice of counsel prior to selling the accused devices . . . goes to the second component of 
the Seagate test—whether defendant knew or should have known with respect to the likelihood 
of infringement.”). But see Anascape Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 9:06-CV-158, 2008 WL 
7182476, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2008) (“[T]he failure to obtain opinion of counsel is not a 
factor supporting willful infringement.”). Under the recently passed Leahy–Smith America 
Invents Act, however, “[t]he failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel with respect 
to any allegedly infringed patent, or the failure of the infringer to present such advice to the 
court or jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the 
patent.”  Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 206. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA’S MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 47–48 
(2008) (“In making the determination as to willfulness, you must consider the totality of the 
circumstances. The totality of the circumstances comprises a number of factors, which include, 
but are not limited to . . . whether [the Defendant] relied on competent legal advice”), available 
at http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/other-pubs/documents/2008_03_27_ 
AIPLA_Model_Jury_Instructions.pdf; MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE N. DIST. OF 
CALIFORNIA, supra note 187, § 3.11, at 22–23 (“In deciding whether [alleged infringer] acted 
with reckless disregard for [patent holder]’s patent, you should consider all of the facts 
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There is a widespread perception that opinions of counsel remain a 
strong defense against willfulness charges after Seagate. For example, patent 
litigators have asserted that “opinions of counsel remain a key defense to 
willfulness”207 and that “opinions of counsel are still important”208 after 
Seagate. Similar sentiments have been expressed in bar journals209 and law 
review articles.210 
The empirical evidence does not appear to support these claims, 
however. The relationship between opinions of counsel and willfulness 
findings was not statistically significant (p = 0.486). Indeed, the raw data 
makes this apparent. After Seagate, when accused infringers offered an 
opinion of counsel as a defense, they were found willful 43% of the time (13 
of 30 cases). When an opinion of counsel was not offered, however, 
willfulness was found at nearly the same rate—44% of the time (47 of 106 
cases). Thus, after Seagate, it appears that an accused infringer’s failure to 
obtain and offer an opinion of counsel, by itself, is “insufficient to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that . . . infringement was 
willful.”211 
It is possible that selection effects may play a role here as well, and thus 
opinions of counsel might have an impact on willfulness findings that is not 
reflected in the dataset. As previously mentioned, selection-effects theory 
explains that the disputes selected for resolution in litigation are not a 
random sample because parties take into account information regarding 
 
surrounding the alleged infringement including, but not limited to . . . [w]hether [alleged 
infringer] relied on a legal opinion that was well-supported and believable and that advised 
[alleged infringer] (1) that the [product] [method] did not infringe [patent holder]’s patent 
or (2) that the patent was invalid [or unenforceable].”). For both model instructions, the 
language regarding opinions of counsel is included only if the accused infringer has relied on 
an opinion of counsel as a defense to willfulness. 
 207. Charles S. Barquist & Bita Rahebi, Willfulness Post-Seagate and the Decision To Rely on 
Advice of Counsel, in 2 PATENT LITIGATION 2010, at 112, 123 (PLI, 2010). 
 208. Neil C. Jones, Ashley B. Summer & Brian D. McAlhaney, Using Opinion Letters and 
Defending Against Willful Infringement, in 2 PATENT LITIGATION 2010, supra note 207, at 171, 185. 
 209. See William L. LaFuze & Michael A. Valek, Litigating Willful Infringement in the Post-
Seagate World, 1 LANDSLIDE 9, 10–11 (Jan./Feb. 2009) (asserting that “[p]re-suit opinions of 
counsel can still be a great defense against willfulness” after Seagate). 
 210. See Lanks, supra note 74, at 626 (asserting the “post-In re Seagate standard makes it 
incredibly hard to prove willful infringement when the defendant obtained an opinion of 
counsel prior to committing the conduct which the patentee alleges was willful infringement”). 
 211. Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 
1325 (S.D. Cal. 2010); see also DR Sys., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 08-CV-669-H (BLM), 
2009 WL 3756765, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2009) (holding that summary judgment of no 
willfulness should be granted despite accused infringer’s “fail[ure] to obtain an opinion letter 
from a lawyer regarding the alleged infringement”); Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 639 
F. Supp. 2d 406, 417 & n.52 (D. Del. 2009) (granting summary judgment of no willfulness, 
even though Amazon.com had never “sought or obtained a legal opinion on non-infringement 
or invalidity”). 
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their likelihood of success on a claim.212 In the willfulness context, the 
existence of a competent opinion of counsel regarding noninfringement or 
invalidity may be important information that would cause patentees not to 
pursue weaker willfulness claims to final judgment.213 Furthermore, due to 
the expense of opinion letters, which can cost tens of thousands of dollars 
per patent,214 companies that receive large numbers of infringement claims 
may obtain opinions only in cases where there is a serious issue regarding 
willfulness.215 This could skew the pool of post-Seagate willfulness decisions 
toward cases where a strong case of willful infringement exists despite an 
opinion of counsel.216 
2. Substantial Defense to Infringement 
Another commonly mentioned factor for determining willfulness is 
whether the accused infringer has a “substantial,” “legitimate,” or “credible” 
defense to the patentee’s claims. Thus, a substantial noninfringement 
defense, even if unsuccessful, may be sufficient to defeat a willful 
infringement finding.217 Likewise, credible invalidity arguments can support 
 
 212. See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Pan C. Lee, A Matter of Opinion: Opinions of Counsel Remain Necessary After In re 
Seagate, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33, 46 (2010) (“An opinion letter serves as evidence of what 
the accused infringer knew or should have known. Thus, an opinion of counsel declaring non-
infringement or invalidity refutes knowledge of any objectively high likelihood of 
infringement.”). 
 214. See Lemley & Tangri, supra note 28, at 1092 (estimating that the cost for an opinion 
letter is “between $20,000 and $100,000 per patent”); Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, 
The Evolution of and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 
102 (2001) (“When rendered by outside counsel, patent opinions generally cost at least 
$20,000, and frequently cost over $100,000.”); see also AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 
supra note 33, at I-137 (reporting that the average cost for an opinion letter on both 
infringement and validity was approximately $19,000 per patent). 
 215. Cf. Lee, supra note 213, at 40 (explaining that “due to the costs involved with 
obtaining an opinion of counsel, companies that received many infringement notices found 
obtaining an opinion letter in response to each notice infeasible,” and as a result, “an accused 
infringer was likely often forced to make judgment calls” regarding the seriousness of the 
claim). 
 216. See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 
2d 474, 478 (D. Del. 2010) (“[T]he post-litigation opinions obtained by [the accused 
infringer] with regard to the ’075 patent . . . are insufficient to overcome the overwhelming 
evidence of willful infringement presented by [patentee].”); Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. 
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying the accused infringer’s post-trial 
motion for judgment as a matter of law of no willfulness, even though it had an opinion of 
counsel regarding noninfringement), aff’d, 616 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Order at 3–4, 
Pioneer Corp. v. Samsung SDI Co., No. 2:06-CV-384 (DF) (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) (denying 
accused infringer’s motion for summary judgment of no willfulness despite the existence of an 
opinion of counsel regarding both noninfringement and invalidity, stating that “[a] reasonable 
jury could . . . find that [the accused infringer] acted despite an objectively high likelihood that 
its actions constituted infringement”). 
 217. See, e.g., DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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a finding of no willfulness.218 For example, in Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. 
Abbott Laboratories,219 the district court granted the defendant’s post-trial 
motion for judgment as a matter of law for a finding of no willfulness 
because “the issues of infringement and validity were hotly contested, close, 
and required an intensely factual inquiry.”220 In addition, in ResQNet.com, 
Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the district court found that, “[w]hile [defendant] was 
ultimately unsuccessful in defending against infringement or proving 
invalidity,” it had not been objectively reckless because “its arguments in 
these areas were substantial, reasonable, and far from the sort of easily-
dismissed claims that an objectively reckless infringer would be forced to rely 
upon.”221 In addition, a “close call” on claim construction can also defeat a 
claim of objective recklessness.222 And other potential defenses, such as the 
existence of a license, may prevent a willfulness finding as well.223 
To code a case as having a “substantial” or “legitimate” defense to an 
infringement claim, the author required an explicit determination by the 
finder of fact. This almost always occurred in a written judicial decision on 
willfulness or enhanced damages. For instance, in LG Display Co. v. AU 
Optronics Corp., the district court found the accused infringer’s conduct was 
not willful after a bench trial because it had “maintained plausible and 
credible defenses to infringement and plausible and credible arguments 
concerning invalidity of the asserted patents.”224 Similarly, in National Oilwell 
Varco L.P. v. Pason Systems USA Corp., the district court denied an award of 
 
 218. See, e.g., Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., 260 F. App’x 284, 291 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (“[B]oth legitimate defenses to infringement claims and credible invalidity 
arguments demonstrate the lack of an objectively high likelihood that a party took actions 
constituting willful infringement of a valid patent.”); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (D. Del. 2008) (concluding that “plausible 
or credible defenses to noninfringement and invalidity” must be considered in determining 
willfulness). 
 219. Order, Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:07-CV-139-TJW (E.D. Tex. 
Oct. 1, 2009) (on file with author). 
 220. Id. at 6. 
 221. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 397, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part on other grounds, 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 222. See, e.g., Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (affirming trial court’s finding of no willful infringement because claim construction was 
a “sufficiently close question” and the disputed claim term was “susceptible to a reasonable 
construction under which [the accused infringer’s] products did not infringe”); Order at 7, 
Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 669 F. Supp. 2d 756, 773 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 
2:07-Cv-130-TJW) (holding that a “close issue of claim construction” can be considered in 
determining “whether the first prong of Seagate is met”), rev’d, 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 223. Wis. Alumni Research Found. v. Intel Corp., 656 F. Supp. 2d 898, 923–24 (W.D. Wis. 
2009). 
 224. LG Display Co. v. AU Optronics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 2d 466, 471 (D. Del. 2010); see 
also Arlington Indus., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 487, 504 (M.D. Pa. 2010) 
(holding that the accused infringer “maintained a reasonable non-infringement defense, one 
that entitles it to a finding of non-willfulness”). 
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enhanced damages despite a jury’s finding of willfulness because the 
accused infringer had “advanced credible arguments that [the asserted] 
claims . . . are invalid on the basis of anticipation or obviousness, and the 
question was close.” Therefore, “a substantial challenge to the validity of the 
claims in suit” existed.225 
From the dataset, it appears that a substantial defense to infringement is 
the single best way to defeat a willfulness claim. The low odds ratio for this 
factor (0.124) suggest that an accused infringer is several times less likely to 
be found willful if it can establish that it had a substantial or credible 
defense to the patentee’s infringement claim. Specifically, when a 
substantial defense existed, willfulness was found only 13% of the time (5 of 
40 cases), compared to 57% of the time when no substantial defense was 
found (55 of 96 cases).226 This relationship is highly statistically significant 
(p = 0.000). 
3. Copying 
Before Seagate, deliberate copying of a patent invention was considered 
“strong evidence of willful infringement.”227 For example, a recent study by 
Christopher Cotropia and Mark Lemley that examined copying in patent 
cases from January 2006 through February 2008 found that, except for 
 
 225. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA Corp., No. 03-CV-02579-RPM, 2009 WL 
1193263, at *7–8 (D. Colo. Apr. 30, 2009); see also Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., No. 01-
051 GMS, 2008 WL 1976624, at *6 (D. Del. May 5, 2008) (denying enhanced damages because 
the accused infringer “relied on substantial defenses, both at trial and on appeal, which 
overcame nearly all of [the patentee]’s claims”). But see Saint-Gobain Autover USA, Inc. v. Xinyi 
Glass N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 737, 747 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (explicitly rejecting the accused 
infringer’s argument that there was a close call on claim construction and awarding enhanced 
damages for willful infringement). 
 226. In fact, it is possible that these figures may actually understate the importance of a 
substantial or legitimate defense to infringement regarding willfulness. Because it was not 
possible to look into the “black box” of a jury’s deliberations regarding willfulness, the coding 
instructions required a written finding to classify a case as having a substantial or legitimate 
defense. This meant a judicial decision—for instance, a summary judgment decision; a post-trial 
decision, such as a grant of JMOL on willfulness or a denial of enhanced damages because 
there was “close call” on infringement or invalidity; or findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
a bench trial—was necessary to code a case as having a substantial defense. Cases where a jury 
found no willfulness due to a substantial defense, but there was no post-trial judicial decision on 
the issue (for example, because the patentee did not file a motion for JMOL or new trial on 
willfulness), were classified as having “no substantial defense.” 
 227. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1127 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 
510 U.S. 908 (1993); see also State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1582 
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (“[C]opying is evidence of willful infringement.”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 
(1990); Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming district 
court’s finding of willfulness and award of double damages when infringer “faithfully copied 
the claimed invention”). 
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Hatch–Waxman litigation, “successful proof of copying overwhelmingly 
leads to a finding of willfulness.”228 
After Seagate, evidence of copying is relevant “to Seagate’s second prong, 
as it may show what the accused infringer knew or should have known about 
the likelihood of its infringement.”229 For example, in Minks v. Polaris 
Industries, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding of willfulness 
and the district court’s award of double enhanced damages when it was 
“fairly clear” the infringer had “deliberately copied [the patentee’s] 
patented reverse speed limiter.”230 Similarly, in Finjan Software, Ltd. v. Secure 
Computing Corp., after a jury found willful infringement, the district court 
denied the infringer’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on 
willfulness because the patentee had “offered evidence indicating that [the 
infringer] used the Finjan patents as a ‘road map’ to develop its [own 
software] products.”231 
Based on the data collected in this study, copying remains an important 
consideration for willfulness after Seagate. When a patentee offered evidence 
of copying by the accused infringer,232 willfulness was found almost two-
thirds (63.3%) of the time (38 of 60 cases). In contrast, when there was no 
evidence that the accused infringer had copied, willfulness was found less 
than a third (29.0%) of the time (22 of 76 cases), a difference that was 
highly statistically significant (p = 0.003). Copying was particularly important 
 
 228. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 165, at 1455. In their study, Cotropia and Lemley 
examined court opinions and found that copying was alleged in slightly over a quarter of cases 
(26%) that decided willfulness. Id. at 1454. In the present dataset, patentees were found to 
present evidence of copying at a somewhat higher rate (43%). This is likely due to the fact that 
the author reviewed court filings such as pretrial and post-trial motions and, in a substantial 
number of cases, trial transcripts, regarding willfulness and enhanced damages. Some of these 
sources included evidence or allegations of copying that was not explicitly referenced in a court 
opinion. 
 229. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). However, evidence of copying is not relevant to Seagate’s first, objective prong because 
“[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Seagate Tech, LLC, 
497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)). 
 230. Minks v. Polaris Indus. Inc., 546 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Minks v. 
Polaris Indus., Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1894-Orl-31KRS, 2007 WL 788418, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 
2007) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 231. Finjan Software, Ltd. v. Secure Computing Corp., No. 06-369 (GMS), 2009 WL 
2524495, at *1, *8 (D. Del. Aug. 18, 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Finjan, Inc. v. 
Secure Computing Corp., 626 F. 3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Order at 5, 9, DataTreasury 
Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06-CV-72 DF (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2010), 2010 WL 5140718, 
at *3, *5 (awarding enhanced damages of $26.6 million in part because “[p]laintiff has 
presented some circumstantial evidence of copying”). 
 232. Under the coding instructions, a case was classified as involving copying where the 
patentee “offered evidence that the accused infringer copied the patentee’s invention.” This 
differs from Cotropia & Lemley’s study, which evaluated whether there was a “finding of 
willfulness” in a judicial opinion. Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 165, at 1453–54 (emphasis 
added). 
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when judges made the final decision on willfulness, as the absence of any 
evidence of copying almost always (92.3%) resulted in a finding of no 
willfulness (48 of 52 cases). This relationship also was highly statistically 
significant (p = 0.003). As a result, “copying [remains] good evidence of 
willful infringement.”233 
4. Design Around 
Numerous pre-Seagate decisions considered good-faith attempts to 
“design around” a patent as evidence of the accused infringer’s lack of 
willful intent.234 This factor continues to be relevant after Seagate. For 
example, in Trading Technologies International, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law of 
no willfulness because the infringer’s “[p]rompt redesign efforts and 
complete removal of infringing products in a span of a few months suggest 
that [the defendant] was not objectively reckless.”235 Similarly, in Alloc, Inc. v. 
Norman D. Lifton Co., the district court granted summary judgment of no 
willful infringement when, inter alia, the defendant “took reasonable steps to 
design around” the patents-in-suit by adopting technology from an expired 
patent.236 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit Bar Association’s model 
instructions instruct the jury that it may consider whether the alleged 
infringer “attempted to design around the [asserted] patent” as evidence of 
its lack of willfulness.237 
Based on the data in this study, however, it appears that evidence of the 
infringer attempting to design around a patent is often insufficient by itself 
to prevent a willfulness finding. In fact, willfulness findings were slightly 
higher—51.7% (15 of 29 cases)—when the accused infringer offered 
evidence that it had designed around the patented technology, as opposed 
to 42.1% of the time (45 of 107 cases) when such evidence was not offered. 
Furthermore, this relationship was not statistically significant (p = 0.686). 
This unexpected outcome may be partly because accused infringers 
usually invoke a “design around” as a “defense” to evidence of deliberate 
copying. Over two-thirds of cases (69.0%, 20 of 29 cases) where the accused 
infringer attempted to prove a “design around” also included evidence of 
 
 233. Id. at 1454. 
 234. See, e.g., Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“We have noted a 
good faith effort to ‘design around’ as indicating support for a non-willful finding.”), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988). 
 235. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see 
also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (considering the fact 
that “Microsoft did not . . . attempt to design around” the patent-in-suit after becoming aware of 
it as evidence of willfulness), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 236. Alloc, Inc. v. Norman D. Lifton Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 237. FED. CIR. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 187, § 3.8(4). 
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copying. This relationship was highly statistically significant (p = 0.002). 
Indeed, some courts have recognized the connection between a “design 
around” and copying. For example, in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., the district 
court characterized the defendant’s conduct as copying and refused to 
overturn the jury’s verdict of “willful and wanton infringement.”238 On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, recognizing that while the patentee’s 
product “served as the starting point for [the defendant’s] design efforts,” it 
had adopted “specific changes . . . to avoid infringement” of the patents-in-
suit.239 However, the Federal Circuit also cautioned that “determining when 
a patented device has been ‘designed around’ enough to avoid infringement 
is a difficult determination to make” and that in many cases a potential 
infringer “cannot know for certain that changes are sufficient to avoid 
infringement until a judge or a jury has made that determination.”240 
Ultimately, when the patentee and accused infringer both offer evidence of 
copying and a “design around,” respectively, the jury can only believe one of 
them—and it appears they are generally siding with the patentee. 
5. Reexamination 
Some accused infringers also have sought to use the fact that a patent-
in-suit has been subject to reexamination by the PTO as a defense to a claim 
of willfulness.241 A request for reexamination can be made by anyone, 
including an accused infringer, and is granted when it raises a “substantial 
new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent,” regardless of 
whether the asserted prior art “was previously cited by or to the [PTO] or 
considered by the [PTO]” during original examination.242 In recent years, 
over 90% of requests for reexamination have been granted by the PTO.243 
Indeed, requests for reexamination—either ex parte or inter partes—are 
increasingly used as a tactic by accused infringers in patent-infringement 
cases, in an attempt to invalidate part or all of the asserted claims of the 
 
 238. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated in part by 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. MATTHEW A. SMITH, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION § 12.12 (2010); see also Robert 
Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with Concurrent District Court Litigation or Section 337 
USITC Investigations, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 115, 135 (2009) (“Another extremely hot topic in 
concurrent reexamination and litigation is the use of reexaminations as a defense against willful 
infringement.”). 
 242. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). 
 243. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA–
SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 ¶ 5 (2010) (noting that 92% of ex parte requests for reexamination have 
been granted since July 1, 1981), available at http://reexamcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/01/2010-09-30-Ex-Parte.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA–SEPTEMBER 30, 2010 ¶ 5 (2010) (noting that 96% of inter parte 
requests for reexamination have been granted since November 29, 1999), available at http:// 
reexamcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/2010-09-30-Inter-Partes.pdf. 
A2 - SEAMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2011  7:36 PM 
2012] WILLFUL PATENT INFRINGEMENT & ENHANCED DAMAGES 461 
patent(s)-in-suit, to delay litigation, or to force the patentee to reach an 
early settlement.244 
At present, there is a conflict in the lower courts as to whether a 
reexamination proceeding is relevant to willfulness. Shortly after Seagate, one 
district court granted summary judgment of no willful infringement based in 
part on the PTO’s order granting a reexamination request.245 The court 
held that, while it did “not assume that a reexamination order will always 
prevent a plaintiff from meeting their burden on summary judgment 
regarding willful infringement,” a reexamination order is “one factor among 
the totality of the circumstances” to consider.246 Several other decisions have 
reached similar conclusions.247 At least two other district courts, however, 
have held that pending reexamination proceedings should not be 
considered in determining willfulness.248 
 
 244. See, e.g., Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Legal Nuances When a Patent-Holding Company Seeks To 
Enforce a U.S. Patent, 49 IDEA 549, 576 (2009) (“A litigation tactic that has gained in popularity 
over the last several years involves an accused infringer—after being served with an 
infringement complaint—seeking an ex parte or inter partes reexamination in the PTO and then 
requesting that the district court stay the infringement litigation pending the outcome of the 
reexamination proceeding.” (footnote omitted)); Roger Shang, Inter Partes Reexamination and 
Improving Patent Quality, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 185, 198 (2009) (“[C]hallengers may 
abuse the [reexamination] procedure by filing inter partes reexamination requests not to 
invalidate patents on the merits, but merely as a delay tactic, hoping that the reexamination will 
convince a court to stay patent infringement litigation launched against the challenger.”); 
Joseph Rosenbloom, The Reexamination Gamble, IP L. & BUS., July 2008, at 31, 32 (explaining 
that requests for reexamination related to litigation increased from 116 in 2003 to 450 in 
2007). 
 245. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., No. 07-CV-2000-H(CBA) et al., 2007 WL 
6955272, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2007). 
 246. Id. at *7. 
 247. See, e.g., Safoco, Inc. v. Cameron Int’l Corp., No. H-05-0739, 2009 WL 2424108, at *20 
(S.D. Tex. July 31, 2009) (“[T]he granting of a reexamination request by the USPTO is only a 
single factor to consider and is not dispositive as to the objective prong of the willful 
infringement standard.”); TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 579 (E.D. Tex. 
2007) (granting judgment as a matter of law of no willfulness in part because “[t]he patentee 
was concerned enough to ask for reexamination” of the patent-in-suit), appeal dismissed as per 
agreement, 274 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2008); cf. Pivonka v. Cent. Garden & Pet Co., No. 02-cv-
02394-RPM, 2008 WL 486049, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 19, 2008) (holding that a preliminary 
order in an interference proceeding determining that the claims of the patent-in-suit were 
obvious meant the patentee “cannot meet [its] burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendants acted despite an objectively high likelihood that [its] actions 
constituted infringement of a valid patent” after Seagate). 
 248. Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co.‚ 675 F. Supp. 2d 881, 894–95 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (concluding 
that “the grant of a reexamination and interim PTO rejections are not probative (i.e., not 
relevant, and therefore not admissible) evidence on the question of patentability” and thus 
“cannot be considered to have decreased the objective likelihood that [the defendant] was 
infringing a valid patent”); Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Technical Ceramics Corp., No. 08-
CV-335-IEG (NLS), 2009 WL 3822694, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009) (excluding evidence of 
a reexamination proceeding initiated by the accused infringer on the issue of willfulness 
because the reexamination had “very little probative value” and “the prejudicial effect as well as 
potential for jury confusion [was] great”). 
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There is also a potentially important difference in whether a 
reexamination proceeding was still pending when willfulness was decided or 
whether the reexamination already had been decided in the patentee’s 
favor.249 For example, in St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc. v. 
Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., the district court permitted the patentee 
to amend its complaint to add an allegation of willful infringement, 
rejecting the defendant’s argument that a grant of reexamination by the 
PTO defeated a claim for willful infringement per se.250 Rather, the court 
explained that because the reexamination proceeding had “resulted in the 
issuance of reexamination certificates for each of the patents-in-suit without 
amendment to any of the claims,” the willfulness claim was not futile or 
made without a sufficient evidentiary basis.251 Likewise, in Safoco, Inc. v. 
Cameron International Corp., the district court held “the outcome of a 
reexamination proceeding is far more persuasive . . . as to whether the 
defendant acted ‘despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions 
constituted infringement of a valid patent,’ than the mere fact that a 
reexamination proceeding occurred.”252 As a result, all cases that involved a 
reexamined patent were coded into two separate categories: (1) whether the 
reexamination proceeding had been resolved by the PTO—either by 
issuance of a Reexamination Certificate, or a Notice of Intent to do so—
before willfulness was decided; and (2) whether the reexamination request 
had been granted but was still pending at the PTO when willfulness was 
decided. 
Ultimately, however, it appears that neither type of reexamination—
decided or still pending—had much effect on willfulness decisions. Cases 
where a reexamination was still pending when willfulness was decided had a 
slightly lower percentage (40%, 4 of 10 cases) of willfulness findings than 
cases that did not involve any reexamination (43.4%, 46 of 106 cases). And 
willfulness was found at a slightly higher rate in cases where a reexamination 
had already been concluded in the patentee’s favor (50%, 10 of 20 cases). 
But these small differences were not statistically significant (p = 0.819). 
6. Bifurcation 
The final factor studied is whether bifurcation—deciding the issue of 
willfulness separately at trial—had a meaningful effect on willfulness 
decisions. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that “[f]or 
 
 249. In contrast, if a court decided the reexamination proceeding against the patentee by 
rejecting the asserted claim(s), infringement would no longer be an issue. 
 250. St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., No. 04-
1436-JJF-LPS, 2009 WL 1649675, at *1–3 (D. Del. June 10, 2009), objections overruled, 2009 WL 
2340650 (D. Del. July 28, 2009). 
 251. Id. at *2. 
 252. Safoco, Inc. v. Cameron Int’l Corp., No. H-05-0739, 2009 WL 2424108, at *20 (S.D. 
Tex. July 31, 2009) (internal citation omitted). 
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convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the 
[district] court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, 
claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.”253 In patent 
litigation, Rule 42(b) has been employed by some courts to bifurcate liability 
from willfulness and damages.254 Indeed, before Seagate, the Federal Circuit 
stated that “a separate trial on willfulness” is often advisable if an accused 
infringer is “forced to choose between waiving the privilege in order to 
protect itself from a willfulness finding, in which case it may risk prejudicing 
itself on the question of liability, and maintaining the privilege, in which 
case it may risk being found to be a willful infringer if liability is found.”255 
Willfulness may also be tried separately because it risks inflaming and 
prejudicing the jury.256 However, bifurcation is ultimately a matter for the 
trial court’s discretion,257 and numerous courts have denied requests to 
bifurcate willfulness due to concerns about the time, expense, and delay 
associated with a second trial and because evidence regarding liability and 
willfulness often overlap, resulting in potential prejudice to the patentee.258 
The data reveal that the willfulness was bifurcated in almost a fifth 
(18.6%) of cases studied. Bifurcation was much more common when a 
judge finally decided the issue of willfulness (45.7%, 16 of 35 cases) 
 
 253. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
 254. See, e.g., Dutch Branch of Streamserve Dev. AB v. Exstream Software, LLC, No. 08-343-
SLR, 2009 WL 2705932, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2009) (finding that bifurcation of willfulness 
and damages “is appropriate, if not necessary, in all but exceptional patent cases”); Aptargroup, 
Inc. v. Owens-Ill., Inc., No. 02 C 5058, 2003 WL 21557632 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 2003) (bifurcating 
willfulness from liability); Yamaha Hatsudoki Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bombardier Inc., 59 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same). 
 255. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643–44 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also 
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that 
bifurcation “may be useful in meeting the attorney-client privilege problem”), overruled by 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 256. See, e.g., Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., No. 08-542-SLR, 2009 WL 2742750, at 
*1 (D. Del. Aug. 26, 2009) (granting request to bifurcate willfulness because it “is an intrusive 
and inflammatory issue to discover and try”). 
 257. Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 258. See, e.g., Lutron Elecs. Co. v. Crestron Elecs., Inc., No. 2:09 CV 707 DB, 2010 WL 
2024510 (D. Utah May 19, 2010) (denying request to bifurcate willfulness claim); Trading 
Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Bifurcation would 
result in prejudice to plaintiff, who, along with facing a substantial delay in final determination 
of the action, would be forced to present the same evidence in two separate trials.”); Real v. 
Bunn-O-Matic, Corp., 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Bifurcation in patent cases, as in 
others, is the exception, not the rule.”); see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Am. Intel. Prop. Law 
Ass’n at 4, Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nos. 01-1357 et al.), 2003 WL 24305263, at *4 (“Many courts are unwilling 
to bifurcate because two trials require more time and resources and, sometimes, implicate 
Seventh Amendment issues. Moreover, even with bifurcation, the focal point of the willfulness 
inquiry remains the legal advice obtained by the infringer, and the attorney-client relationship 
is still compromised.”). 
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compared to juries (4.5%, 3 of 67 cases). A similar but less pronounced 
difference was found in Judge Moore’s study; she determined that in 
19992000, willfulness was bifurcated in 48.6% of bench trials and 21.7% of 
jury trials. Judge Moore explained these findings on the basis of 
convenience, noting that “[i]t is simply easier for the [district] court to 
conduct a single trial with one jury and to have them answer all the liability 
and damages questions at one time.”259 
In terms of raw numbers, willfulness was found less frequently when it 
was bifurcated—willfulness was found in 31.6% of bifurcated cases (6 of 19 
cases), compared to 57.8% of the time when it was not bifurcated (48 of 83 
cases). However, this result was not statistically significant in a multivariable 
logistic regression that controlled for all other factors (p = 0.343). This may 
be partially due to the high degree of correlation between bifurcation and 
bench trials, as judges are much less likely to find willfulness than juries after 
Seagate. 
C. ENHANCED DAMAGES 
1. Standard 
The final research question was whether Seagate had an impact on 
enhanced-damages awards. An award of enhanced damages for willful 
patent infringement involves a two-step process. First, the fact finder at 
trial—the jury or judge—“must determine if an accused infringer is guilty of 
conduct, such as willfulness, upon which increased damages may be 
based.”260 If willfulness is found, the district court then must “exercise[] its 
discretion to determine if the damages should be increased given the totality 
of the circumstances.”261 Thus, a finding of willfulness does not mandate an 
award of enhanced damages but merely permits it.262 
Seagate does not directly control whether enhanced damages should be 
awarded.263 Rather, “the standard for deciding whether—and by how 
much—to enhance damages” was set forth by the Federal Circuit in Read 
Corp. v. Portec, Inc.264 Read identified nine factors for courts to consider 
regarding enhancement: 
 
 259. Moore, supra note 6, at 235. 
 260. Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(citing Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 261. Id. 
 262. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 1230 (2008). 
 263. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The test for 
willfulness is distinct and separate from the factors guiding a district court’s discretion 
regarding enhanced damages.”), aff’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 264. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 82627 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated in part by 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Spectralytics, Inc. 
v. Cordis Corp, No. 2009-1564, 2010-1004, 2011 WL 2307402, at *10 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2011) 
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(1) “whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design 
of another”; 
(2) “whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a 
good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not 
infringed”; 
(3) “the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation”; 
(4) the accused infringer’s “size and financial condition”; 
(5) the “[c]loseness of the case”; 
(6) the “[d]uration of [infringer]’s misconduct”; 
(7) whether the infringer took any “[r]emedial action”; 
(8) whether the infringer had a “motivation [to] harm” the 
patentee; and 
(9) whether the infringer “attempted to conceal its 
misconduct.”265 
Notably, there is substantial overlap between many of the Read factors for 
enhanced damages and post-Seagate factors for finding willfulness. For 
example, copying is relevant to both willfulness and enhanced damages. 
Similarly, the “closeness of the case” factor is usually satisfied when the 
accused infringer has a substantial defense to infringement. And “remedial 
action” may include an accused infringer’s attempt to design around the 
patent. 
2. Enhanced Damages Before and After Seagate 
For several reasons, the author hypothesized that after Seagate, there 
would probably be a substantial increase in the percentage of cases that 
awarded enhanced damages for willfulness.266 First, if Seagate’s “objective 
recklessness” standard limited willfulness to only the clearest and most 
egregious cases, as commentators suggested,267 then enhanced damages 
should be routinely awarded after Seagate. In addition, the overlap between 
the Read factors for enhanced damages and post-Seagate willfulness factors 
 
(“Seagate did not change the application of the Read factors with respect to enhancement of 
damages when willful infringement under § 285 is found.”). 
 265. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 827; see also Funai Electric Co., v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 
F.3d 1357, 137677 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s decision applying the Read 
factors and denying patentee’s request for enhanced damages); i4i, 598 F.3d at 85859 
(affirming district-court decision applying the Read factors and awarding patentee $40 million 
in enhanced damages). 
 266. A decision on enhanced damages was classified as “after Seagate” when enhanced 
damages were awarded after August 20, 2007, the date of the Seagate decision. 
 267. See supra notes 98104 and accompanying text. 
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also suggested enhanced damages would be awarded most times when 




(Sept. 2004–Aug. 2007) 
After Seagate 
(Aug. 2007–July 2010) 
Enhanced Damages 
Awarded 
     81.4%** 
(35 of 43) 
     54.9%** 
(28 of 51) 
p = 0.006 
Table 6: Enhanced Damages Before and After Seagate268 
(Willfulness Found and Enhanced Damages Requested) 
 
Surprisingly, this hypothesis was rejected by the empirical data. As 
illustrated in Table 6, awards of enhanced damages after a finding of 
willfulness decreased from about 80% before Seagate (81.4%) to slightly over 
half (54.9%) after Seagate. This difference was highly statistically significant 
(p = 0.006) using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test. 
Another issue is whether enhanced damages were awarded at different 
rates depending on whether a judge or a jury found willfulness, both before 
and after Seagate. Judge Moore’s previous study of willfulness from 1983 
through 1999 found such a difference: damages were enhanced in the vast 
majority of cases (95%) where a judge found willfulness but less than two-







 268. The number of enhanced-damages awards is lower than the total number of 
willfulness findings for both the pre-Seagate (44 of 66 cases) and post-Seagate (50 of 64 cases) 
periods for several reasons. First, in a substantial number of cases, the parties settled after a 
finding of willful infringement, but before the district court could decide the patentee’s request 
for enhanced damages. See, e.g., VirnetX, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07 CV 80, 2009 WL 
2370727 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2009); 3Com Corp. v. Realtek Semiconductor Corp., No. C 03-
2177 VRW, 2008 WL 783383 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2008); LifeNet, Inc. v. Musculoskeletal 
Transplant Found., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Va. 2007). Second, in some cases, the 
patentee did not request an enhanced-damage award, even though willfulness was found. This 
occurred, for example, when the amount of monetary damages awarded was low or when 
patentees requested only an award of attorney’s fees, which is another potential remedy for 
willfulness. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. Finally, there were several post-Seagate 
cases where the patentee’s enhancement request was still pending at the conclusion of the study 
period. See, e.g., K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., No. 2:06-CV-108-TC, 2010 WL 2079682 (D. 
Utah May 24, 2010); WhitServe LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., No. 3:06CV01935 (AVC), 
2007 WL 2028764 (D. Conn. July 11, 2007). 
 269. Moore, supra note 59, at 394. 
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(29 of 36) 
48.8%** 
(21 of 43) 




(6 of 7) 
87.5%* 
(7 of 8) 
p = 1.000 
 p = 1.000 p = 0.044  
Table 7: Enhanced Damages, Judge vs. Jury Finding of Willfulness 
 
Table 7 shows that before Seagate, there was no statistically significant 
difference (p = 1.000) using Fisher’s exact test whether a jury or judge 
decided willfulness: district courts awarded enhanced damages over 80% of 
the time in both situations (80.6% when the jury found willfulness, 
compared to 85.7% when a judge found willfulness). However, there was a 
notable change after Seagate, as enhanced damages were awarded less than 
half the time (48.8%) after a jury finding of willfulness. This difference with 
pre-Seagate jury trials was highly statistically significant (p = 0.004) using 
Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test. It also represented a large difference 
compared to judicial findings of willfulness, which resulted in enhanced 
damages almost all of the time (87.5%). This difference was statistically 
significant (p = 0.044) using Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test. 
Based on this data, it appears that district courts, after Seagate, are 
simply declining to award enhanced damages, rather than overturning 
questionable jury findings of willfulness.270 It has long been recognized that 
when the evidence supporting a jury’s willfulness findings is relatively weak, 
it is appropriate for the district court to not award enhanced damages.271 
Furthermore, for a district court concerned about potential review by the 
 
 270. See, e.g., Mass Engineered Design, Inc. v. Ergotron, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 361, 379–80, 
390–92 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (declining to overturn jury’s finding of willfulness but declining to 
award enhanced damages, explaining that “a court can refrain from awarding enhanced 
damages in light of a finding of willfulness based on the weight of the evidence supporting 
willfulness and the closeness of the issues at trial”); Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 592 
F. Supp. 2d 727, 750 (D. Del. 2009) (“Although the jury found that Cisco’s infringement . . . 
was willful, the court finds that the evidence was not strong enough to warrant enhanced 
damages.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded on other grounds, 612 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Safety 1st, Inc., No. 01-051 GMS, 2008 WL 1976624, at *6–7 (D. 
Del. May 5, 2008) (declining to award enhanced damages and denying as moot defendant’s 
post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law on willfulness). 
 271. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115 F.3d 947, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming 
the district-court decision denying enhanced damages despite willfulness finding by jury 
“because of the closeness of both the infringement and willfulness issues”); Brooktree Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that when “the 
evidence supporting the jury’s finding [of willfulness] was not as strong as it could have been,” 
enhanced damages may be denied (quoting Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
757 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D. Cal 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit is less likely to reverse a denial of 
enhanced damages on appeal. An award of enhanced damages is within the 
trial court’s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless this 
discretion has been abused.272 In contrast, a jury finding of willful 
infringement can be overturned only if the verdict is not supported by 
substantial evidence273 or if the jury was improperly instructed about the law 
governing willfulness.274 In addition, because willfulness usually requires a 
jury to evaluate the accused infringer’s “intent, belief, and credibility,”275 “a 
finding of willful infringement [must] be sustained unless the reviewing 
court has a definite and firm conviction that the [jury] erred.”276 Thus, after 
Seagate, district courts appear to use enhanced damages “as a check to 
temper jury findings on willfulness.”277 
3. Amount of Enhancement 
Another important issue is the amount of enhanced damages. If 
enhanced damages are granted, the district court has the discretion to 
determine the amount of enhancement, up to three times the award of 
compensatory damages.278 “The amount of enhancement must bear some 





 272. E.g., ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfr. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Gen. Scanning Inc., 247 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2001); cf. 
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“[T]here is 
no merit to the argument that a finding of willfulness but a denial of enhanced damages is 
necessarily an abuse of discretion.”). 
 273. See, e.g., Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 274. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (vacating finding of 
willfulness and remanding for determination when the district court improperly instructed the 
jury after Seagate, and this error was not harmless because it “may have changed the result of the 
jury verdict”). 
 275. SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(citing Sensonics, Inc. v. Aerosonic Corp., 81 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 276. Id. (citing Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1057 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994)). 
 277. Moore, supra note 59, at 394. 
 278. See, e.g., Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he district court enjoys discretion to choose whether to award enhanced damages 
to the claimant and in what amount. This discretion, however is limited to a trebling of the 
basic damage award.” (quoting Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 279. Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 794 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also BRYAN W. 
BUTLER, PATENT INFRINGEMENT: COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES § 7.02[4][b] (2010) (“[T]he 
actual amount of the award [of enhanced damages] may be adjusted to match the level of 
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct.”). 
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Figure 3: Amount of Enhancement, Sept. 2004–July 2010 
 
Figure 3 depicts the amount of enhanced damages awarded during the 
entire study period, expressed as a percentage of compensatory damages. In 
other words, a figure of 150% represents a 50% enhancement compared to 
compensatory damages, while 300% represents treble damages (the 
maximum amount permitted by statute). 
As shown above, less than a third of enhanced-damages awards during 
the entire study period (both before and after Seagate) were for treble 
damages. In fact, most (over 70%) enhanced-damages awards were for 
double damages or less.280 The mean enhancement was 207%. This figure is 
higher than the amount of enhancement found in Judge Moore’s study, 
which found an average enhancement of 169%.281 
Another issue examined was whether there was a statistically significant 
difference in the amount of enhancement before and after Seagate. As with 
enhanced damages generally, the author hypothesized that the amount of 
enhancement would be higher after Seagate because, if the conventional 
wisdom was correct, only truly egregious cases would be found willful under 
Seagate’s “objective recklessness” standard. As a result, the author expected 
that post-Seagate willful infringers would be punished more harshly for their 
 
 280. Slightly fewer than 40% of all enhanced-damages awards are for less than double 
damages (under 200%), and about 30% are for double damages (200%). 
 281. Moore, supra note 59, at 394. 
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misconduct than the pre-Seagate cohort. However, this prediction was 
incorrect as well. 
 
Table 8: Mean Enhancement Before and After Seagate282 
 
As indicated in Table 8, the amount of enhancement after Seagate was 
actually slightly lower. Before Seagate, the mean enhancement was slightly 
greater than double damages (213%), while after Seagate, the mean 
enhancement was slightly less than double damages (198%). Using 
regression analysis, this difference was not statistically significant (p = 0.399). 
In an attempt to understand this unexpected outcome, the author further 
examined the post-Seagate enhanced-damages awards to determine if there 
was a difference in enhancement based on whether a jury or judge found 
willfulness. 
 




n = 19 
243%* 
n = 7 
p = 0.025 
R2 = 0.1930 
Table 9: Mean Enhancement After Seagate, Judge vs. Jury Finding of 
Willfulness 
 
Using regression analysis, there was a statistically significant (p = 0.025) 
difference after Seagate in enhancement depending on whether a jury or 
judge had found willfulness at trial. As depicted in Table 9, mean 
 
 282. In one case, the amount of enhancement could not be determined because this 
information was under seal in both the lower and appellate court records. See Spine Solutions, 
Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., No. 07-CV-2175-JPM-dKV, 2008 WL 4831770 
(W.D. Tenn. July 2, 2008), aff’d, 620 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In another case, the district 
court granted the patentee’s motion to enhance damages, but the court’s docket entry did not 
identify the amount of enhancement. See LG, Philips LCD Co. v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd., 
No. cv 02-6775 CBM (JTLx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2007) (order granting LG, Philips LCD Co. 
Ltd’s motion for enhanced damages). The parties settled their dispute shortly thereafter. See 
Order re Rule 41 Stipulation of Dismissal, Philips LCD Co. v. Chunghwa Picture Tubes, Ltd. 
No. cv 02-6775 CBM (JTLx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2008). 
 Before Seagate 
(Sept. 2004–Aug. 2007) 
After Seagate 




n = 35 
198% 
n = 26 
p = 0.399 
R2 = 0.0121 
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enhancement was 243% when a judge found willfulness, compared to a 
mean enhancement of 182% when a jury found willfulness. As a result, not 
only are enhanced damages awarded less often when juries find willfulness, 
the amount of enhancement is usually lower as well. This also partially 
explains the lower-than-expected overall mean enhancement after Seagate, as 
most post-Seagate decisions (over 70%) involved jury findings of willfulness. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The data collected in this study calls into question some of the 
conventional wisdom regarding Seagate’s impact on willful patent 
infringement. Most willfulness decisions are still made at trial, rather than 
through summary judgment or other pretrial motions. And courts still find 
willfulness close to 40% of the time after Seagate, despite expectations that its 
“objective recklessness” standard would be extremely difficult to satisfy. 
Notably, the difference between willfulness decisions before and after Seagate 
was not statistically significant. 
Another important finding from this study is that willfulness decisions 
and enhanced-damage awards after Seagate vary greatly depending on 
whether a judge or a jury was the decisionmaker at trial. At trial, juries find 
willful infringement over 60% of the time, while in contrast, judges find 
willfulness less than one-third of the time (and less than one-quarter if 
preverdict JMOL decisions are included). This raises important questions 
about the potential competency and bias of jurors in deciding willfulness. 
However, it also appears that district courts use their discretion 
regarding enhanced-damages awards as a “check” on willfulness findings by 
juries. After Seagate, enhanced damages are awarded less than half the time 
when a jury finds willfulness, while enhanced damages are nearly always 
awarded if willfulness is found after a bench trial. Further, the mean 
(average) enhancement after Seagate is significantly lower when a jury finds 
willfulness rather than a judge. 
Finally, this study reached several important findings regarding the 
impact of common factors on willfulness after Seagate. Two factors were 
central to willful patent infringement: evidence of copying by the accused 
infringer was highly correlated with willfulness, while a “substantial” or 
“legitimate” defense to infringement was the strongest predictor of no 
willfulness. Surprisingly, however, neither opinions of counsel nor attempts 
to design around the patent had a statistically significant relationship with 
willfulness decisions. PTO reexaminations and bifurcation of willfulness also 
had no apparent impact on willfulness. 
 
